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a stochastic environment is a diﬃcult task both analytically and computationally, solving
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This paper studies a general model of search on the job that allows for aggregate shocks, idiosyn-
cratic shocks, and diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the contractual environment. The paper’s main result
is that it formally establishes existence of a type of equilibria, called Block Recursive Equilibria
(BRE), which are tractable for studying equilibrium dynamics. To attain this result, we depart
from the bulk of the literature on search on the job, which assumes that search is random or
undirected in the sense that a worker does not have any information about the terms of trade
oﬀered by diﬀerent ﬁrms before applying for jobs. Instead, we assume that search is directed
in the sense that a worker knows the terms of trade oﬀered by diﬀerent ﬁrms before he chooses
w h e r et oa p p l yf o raj o b . 1
The models of random search on the job by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2003), and Burdett and Coles (2003) are a useful tool for studying labor markets because
they can simultaneously and parsimoniously explain a number of qualitative features of the data.
For example, they can explain the empirical regularities in the transition of workers between the
states of employment, unemployment and across jobs that pay diﬀerent wages (e.g. the negative
relationship between job hazard and tenure). They can explain why similar workers employed at
similar ﬁrms are paid diﬀerent wages. They can also explain why wages tend to increase with
tenure and experience.2
However, these models are diﬃcult to solve outside of steady-state because the distribu-
tion of workers across diﬀerent employment states (unemployment, and employment at diﬀerent
wages) is an inﬁnite-dimensional state variable which non-trivially aﬀects agents’ value and policy
functions.3 This technical feature limits the use of these models. For example, a macroeconomist
cannot measure the eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on the ﬂows of workers across diﬀerent
employment states and on the wage distribution by simply comparing steady-states (unless he
has reason to believe that these shocks are very persistent and that the transition phases have
negligible length). A public economist cannot measure the welfare eﬀect of a change to the unem-
ployment beneﬁt legislation by comparing two steady-states (unless he has reason to believe that
1The directed search literature was pioneered by Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991), Moen (1997), Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999), and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).
2Mortensen (1994), Pissarides (1994), and Barlevy (2002) are other popular models of search on the job. These
models have qualitative properties that are very diﬀerent from those of the models by Burdett and Mortensen
(1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and Burdett and Coles (2003). For example, they cannot generate residual
wage inequality.
3Recently, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008) have succeded in characterizing the transitional dynamics of the
model by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) (henceforth, BM98). Their results also suggest that it might be possible
to solve the equilibrium of BM98 in a fully stochastic environment. The current paper provides a model that has
the same qualitative properties as BM98 and can be solved in a stochastic environment.
1agents’ discount factor is approximately zero and, hence, the transition phases are unimportant).
And if an econometrician estimates the steady-state of a model, he has to be careful in using
data from a period of time when the fundamentals of the economy have remained approximately
unchanged.4
Moreover, the hypothesis that the search process is random appears at odds with the empirical
evidence. For example, in a recent survey of the US labor market, Hall and Krueger (2008, Table
1) ﬁnd that 84 percent of white, male, non-college workers either “knew exactly” or “had a pretty
good idea” about how much their current job would pay from the very beginning of the application
process (the time of the ﬁrst interview). Another piece of evidence against the random search
hypothesis and in favor of directed search comes from Holzer, Katz and Krueger (1991). Using
data from the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project Survey, these authors ﬁnd that ﬁrms
in high-wage industries tend to attract more applicants per vacancy that ﬁrms in industries where
the terms of trade are less generous. These ﬁndings should not be surprising, as directed search
reﬂects the fundamental idea in economics that prices help a market allocating resources.
In this paper, we consider a stochastic model of directed search on the job. This model is rather
general in that it allows for aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, and for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
the contractual environment (ﬁxed-wage contracts and dynamic contracts). For this model, we
prove existence of an equilibrium in which agents’ value and policy functions do not depend on
the inﬁnite-dimensional distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states. We refer to
this equilibrium as a Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE). Like the equilibrium of the models by
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and Burdett and Coles (2003),
the BRE of our model generates: (i) worker ﬂows between employment, unemployment, and
across employers; (ii) a negative relationship between job hazard and tenure; (iii) residual wage
inequality; and (iv) a positive return to tenure and experience. However, unlike the equilibrium
of these other models, the BRE of our model can be easily computed in and out of the steady-
state. Therefore, our model can be used, without qualiﬁcations, to carry out the labor market
measurements that we have described above.
It is precisely the diﬀerence in the nature of the search process that explains why our model
admits a Block Recursive Equilibrium and the models by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-
4Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) explicitely acknowledge that estimating the steady-state of an OJS model
restricts their choice of data: “We have deliberately selected a much shorter period than is available because we
want to ﬁnd out whether it is possible to estimate our model over a homogeneous period of the business cycle.
I tw o u l dh a v eb e e nv e r yh a r dt od e f e n dt h ea s s u m p tion of time-invariant parameters (the job oﬀer arrival rate
parameters in particular) had we been using a longer panel.” Similarly, Jolivet et alii (2006) state that “We choose
to restrict our analysis to a 3-year sample for three reasons. [...] Third, the model assumes that the labor market
is in a steady-state, an asusmption that would be harder to defend over a longer period of time.”
2Vinay and Robin (2002), and Burdett and Coles (2003) do not. The search process is directed
in our model but undirected in the other models. If the search process is directed, workers in
diﬀerent employment states choose to apply for diﬀerent jobs, because their current states induce
diﬀerent preferences over the probability of getting a job and the value oﬀered by a job. Therefore,
the distribution of workers across employment states does not aﬀect the beneﬁtt ot h eﬁrm from
creating a vacancy that oﬀers certain terms of trade, the tightness of the labor market and,
ultimately, the agents’ value and policy functions. In contrast, if the search process is random,
workers in diﬀerent employment states search for the same jobs. Therefore, the distribution of
workers across diﬀerent employment states aﬀects the probability that a ﬁrm meets a worker
who is willing to accept certain terms of trade, the beneﬁtt ot h eﬁrm of creating a vacancy, the
tightness of the labor market and, ultimately, the agents’ value and policy functions. At the end
of Section 5, we will provide a more detailed explanation for why directed search is important for
existence of a BRE.
The main contribution of this paper is to prove existence of a BRE for a relatively gen-
eral model of directed search on the job which allows for aggregate shocks, idiosyncratic shocks,
workers’ risk aversion, and for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the contractual environment. By accom-
plishing this task we intend to provide a solid foundation for future applications of models of
directed search on the job. Delacroix and Shi (2006) examine a model of directed search on the
job with ﬁxed-wage contracts. However, their analysis only focuses on the steady-state equilib-
rium. Shi (2008) was the ﬁrst to prove existence of a BRE for a model of directed search on
the job. However, his model restricts attention to a deterministic environment and to the case
of wage/tenure contracts. Menzio and Shi (2008) were the ﬁrst to prove existence of a BRE for
a stochastic model of directed search on the job. In addition, they calibrate their model and
use it to measure the contribution of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical volatility of
unemployment, vacancies, and other labor market variables. However, their model only restricts
attention to the case of complete labor contracts. In order to generalize the results from Shi
(2008) and Menzio and Shi (2008), the current paper has to develop a diﬀerent existence proof.
For example, the existence proof in Menzio and Shi (2008) is based on the equivalence between
the solution to the social planner’s problem and the equilibrium allocation, which does not hold
when employment contracts are incomplete.5
5Moen and Rosen (2004) develop a model of search on the job in which search is directed. In their model,
however, there is no movement of workers between jobs that have the same productivity. Allowing for this movement
is a main source of the diﬃculty of solving for a dynamic equilibrium with on-the-job search, which we resolve here.
32. The Model
2.1. Agents and Markets
The economy is populated by a continuum of workers with measure one and a continuum of
ﬁrms with positive measure. Each worker has a periodical utility function υ(.)d e ﬁned over
consumption, where υ : R → R is a twice-continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, weakly
concave function such that υ0(.) ∈ [υ0, ¯ υ0], 0 <υ 0 ≤ ¯ υ0. Each worker maximizes the expected sum
of periodical utilities discounted at the factor β ∈ (0,1). The unemployment beneﬁti sb.
Each ﬁrm operates a constant returns to scale technology which turns one unit of labor into
y + z units of consumption. The ﬁrst component of productivity, y,i sc o m m o nt oa l lﬁrms, and
its value lies in the set Y = {y1,y 2,...y N(y)},w h e r ey ≡ y1 <. . .<y N(y) ≡ ¯ y and N (y) ≥ 2i s
an integer. The second component of productivity, z, is speciﬁct oe a c hﬁrm-worker pair, and its
value lies in the set Z = {z1,z 2,...z N(z)},w h e r ez ≡ z1 <. . .<z N(z) ≡ ¯ z and N (z) ≥ 1i sa n
integer. Each ﬁrm maximizes the expected sum of periodical proﬁts discounted at the factor β.
The labor market is organized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by the expected lifetime
utility x that the ﬁrms oﬀer to the workers, x ∈ X =[ x, ¯ x], with x <υ (b)/(1 − β)a n d¯ x>
υ(¯ y +¯ z)/(1 − β). Speciﬁcally, whenever a ﬁrm meets a worker in submarket x,t h eﬁrm oﬀers
the worker an employment contract that gives him the expected lifetime utility x. In submarket
x, the ratio of the number of vacancies created by ﬁrms to the number of workers looking for
jobs is given by θ(x,ψ) ≥ 0 and is determined in the equilibrium, where ψ is the aggregate state
of the economy described below. In the remainder of the paper, we shall refer to θ(x,ψ)a st h e
tightness of submarket x.6
Time is discrete and continues forever. At the beginning of each period, the state of the
economy can be summarized by the triple (y,u,g) ≡ ψ.T h e ﬁrst element of ψ denotes the
aggregate component of labor productivity, y ∈ Y . The second element denotes the measure of
workers who are unemployed, u ∈ [0,1]. The third element is a function g : X × Z → [0,1], with
g(V,z) denoting the measure of workers who are employed at jobs that give them the lifetime
utility ˜ V ≤ V and that have an idiosyncratic component of productivity ˜ z ≤ z.
Each period is divided into four stages: separation, search, matching and production. During
the separation stage, an employed worker is forced to move into unemployment with probability
δ ∈ (0,1). Also, during the separation stage, an employed worker has the option to voluntarily
move into unemployment.
6In submarkets that are not visited by any workers, θ(x,ψ) is an out-of-equilibrium conjecture that helps
determining the equilibrium behavior.
4During the second stage, a worker gets the opportunity of searching for a job with a probability
that depends on his recent employment history. In particular, if the worker was unemployed at
the beginning of the period, he can send an application with probability λu ∈ (0,1]. If the worker
was employed at the beginning of the period and did not lose his job during the separation stage,
h ec a ns e a r c hw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yλe ∈ (0,1]. If the worker lost his job during the separation stage,
he cannot search immediately. Conditional on being able to search, the worker chooses which
submarket to visit. In this sense, search is directed. Also, during the search stage, a ﬁrm chooses
how many vacancies to create and where to locate them. The cost of maintaining a vacancy for
one period is k>0. Both workers and ﬁrms take the tightness θ(x,ψ) parametrically.7
During the matching stage, the workers and the vacancies in submarket x come together
through a frictional meeting process. In particular, a worker meets a vacant job with probability
p(θ(x,ψ)), where p : R+ → [0,1] is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly
concave function such that p(0) = 0 and p0(0) < ∞. Similarly, a vacancy meets a worker
with probability q(θ(x,ψ)), where q : R+ → [0,1] is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
decreasing function such that q(θ)=p(θ)/θ, q(0) = 1, and p(q−1(.)) being concave.8 When a
vacancy and a worker meet, the ﬁrm that owns the vacancy oﬀers to the worker an employment
contract that gives him the lifetime utility x. If the worker rejects the oﬀer, he returns to his
previous employment position. If the worker accepts the oﬀer, the two parties form a new match.
To simplify the exposition, we assume that all new matches have the idiosyncratic component of
productivity z0 ∈ Z.
During the last stage, an unemployed worker produces and consumes b ∈ (0, ¯ y +¯ z) units
of output. A worker employed at a job z produces y + z units of output and consumes w
of them, where w is speciﬁed by the worker’s labor contract. At the end of the production
stage, Nature draws next period’s aggregate component of productivity, ˆ y, from the probability
distribution Φˆ y(ˆ y|y), and next period’s idiosyncratic component of productivity, ˆ z,f r o mt h e
probability distribution Φˆ z(ˆ z|z).9 The draws of the idiosyncratic component of productivity are
independent across matches.10
7That is, workers and ﬁrms treat the tightness θ(x,ψ) just like households and ﬁrms treat prices in a Walrasian
Equilibrium.
8The last property of q(θ) is needed to guarantee that the worker’s search problem is strictly concave and its
solution unique. The reader should notice that this property (as well as the other properties of p and q)a r es a t i s ﬁed
by many standard speciﬁcations of the matching process. For example, it is satisﬁed by the CES matching process
q(θ)=[ α/(α + θ
σ)]
1/σ, p(θ)=θ[α/(α + θ
σ)]
1/σ, α ∈ (0,1) and 1 ≥ σ>0.
9Throughout this paper, the caret on a variable indicates the variable in the next period.
10In order to keep the exposition simple, we have chosen to restrict attention to aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks that aﬀect only labor productivity. However, the proof of the existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium
does not depend on this choice, and can be easily generalized to the case in which aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks aﬀect the search process, the value of unemployment, labor income taxes, etc.
52.2. Contractual Environment
We consider two alternative contractual environments. In the ﬁrst environment, the ﬁrm commits
to an employment contract that speciﬁes the worker’s wage as a function of the history of realiza-
tions of the idiosyncratic productivity of the match, z, the history of realizations of the aggregate
state of the economy, ψ, and the history of realizations of a two-point lottery that is drawn at
the beginning of every production stage.11 In the remainder of the paper, we shall refer to this as
the “dynamic contract” environment, since we will formulate the contracts recursively as in the
literature on dynamic contracts (e.g., Atkeson and Lucas, 1992).12 In the second environment,
the ﬁrm commits to a wage that remains constant throughout the entire duration of the employ-
ment relationship. This constant wage is allowed to depend only on the outcome of a two-point
lottery that is drawn at the beginning of the employment relationship. In the remainder of the
paper, we shall refer to this as the “ﬁxed-wage contract” environment.
We are interested in these two contractual environments because they have been the focus
of the literature on random search on the job. The “dynamic contract” environment generalizes
the environment considered by Burdett and Coles (2003) and Shi (2008) to an economy with
stochastic productivity.13 The “ﬁxed-wage contract” environment is the same environment that
has been considered by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), van den Berg and Ridder (1998), and
Jolivet et al. (2006). Notice that, under both speciﬁcations of the environment, contracts are
i n c o m p l e t eb e c a u s ew a g e sc a n n o tb em a d ec o n t i n g e n tu p o nt h eo u t s i d eo ﬀers received by the
worker.
2.3. Worker’s Problem
Consider a worker whose current employment position gives him a lifetime utility V and who has
the opportunity to look for a job at the beginning of the search stage. His search decision is to
choose which submarket x to visit. If the worker visits submarket x, he succeeds in ﬁnding a job
with probability p(θ(x,ψ)), and fails with probability 1 − p(θ(x,ψ)). If he succeeds, he enters
the production stage in a new employment relationship which gives him the lifetime utility x.I f
he fails to ﬁnd a new match (or if he does not apply for a job), he enters the production stage by
11We allow the speciﬁcations of the employment contract to depend on the history of the realizations of these
two-point lotteries in order to guarantee that the ﬁrm’s value function is concave. In this sense, lotteries play a
s i m i l a rr o l ei no u rm o d e la si nP rescott and Townsend (1984).
12In contrast to most models in the literature on dynamic contracts, however, there is no private information in
our model, and a worker can quit for another job or into unemployment in any period during the contract.
13In the special case where workers are risk neutral, the dynamic contracts considered in this paper attain the
same allocation as the complete contracts considered in Menzio and Shi (2008) do. Therefore, the proof of the
existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium in this paper generalizes the existence proof in Menzio and Shi (2008).
6retaining his current employment position, which gives him a lifetime utility V . Therefore, the
worker’s lifetime utility at the beginning of the search stage is V +m a x {0,R(V,ψ)},w h e r e
R(V,ψ)=m a x
x∈X
p(θ(x,ψ))(x − V ). (2.1)
Denote m(V,ψ) as the solution to the maximization problem in (2.1), and ˜ p(V,ψ)a st h ec o m p o s i t e
function p(θ(m(V,ψ),ψ)).
Next, consider an unemployed worker at the beginning of the production stage, and denote
as U(ψ) his lifetime utility. In the current period, the worker produces and consumes b units of
output. During the next search stage period, the worker is unemployed and has the opportunity
to look for a job with probability λu. Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility U(ψ)i se q u a lt o
U(ψ)=υ(b)+βE ˆ ψ
h
U( ˆ ψ)+λu max
n
0,R(U( ˆ ψ), ˆ ψ)
oi
.( 2 . 2 )
2.4. Firm’s Problem
2.4.1. Dynamic Contracts
Consider a ﬁrm that has just met a worker in submarket x.T h e ﬁrm oﬀers to the worker an
employment contract that speciﬁes his wage at every future date as a function of the realized
history of the idiosyncratic productivity of the match, the realized history of the aggregate state of
the economy, and the history of realizations of a two-point lottery that is drawn at the beginning
of every production stage. The ﬁrm chooses the employment contract in order to maximize its
proﬁts and provide the worker with the promised lifetime utility x. Characterizing the solution
to this problem is diﬃcult because the dimension of the history upon which wages are contingent
grows to inﬁnity with time. However, following the literature on dynamic contracts (e.g. Atkeson
and Lucas, 1992), we can rewrite this problem recursively by using the worker’s lifetime utility
as an auxiliary state variable.14
In the recursive formulation of the problem, the state of the contract at the beginning of each
production stage is described by the worker’s lifetime utility, V , by the state of the aggregate
economy, ψ, and by the idiosyncratic productivity of the match, z.L e ts denote (ψ,z). Given V
and s,t h eﬁrm chooses a two-point lottery over the worker’s wage w in the current period, the
worker’s probability d of becoming unemployed in the next separation stage, and the worker’s
14More precisely, we can prove that the value function of the ﬁrm’s contracting problem is the unique solution
to the recursive problem (2.3). Also, we can prove that the ﬁrm’s contracting problem yields the same solutions
as the recurive problem (2.3). The proof of these equivalence results is standard. However, all details are available
upon request.
7lifetime utility ˆ V at the beginning of the next production stage. That is, the ﬁrm chooses a two-
point lottery c =( πi,w i,d i, ˆ Vi)2
i=1,w h e r eπi is the probability with which the realization of the
lottery is (wi,d i, ˆ Vi). The ﬁrm’s choice is subject to a promise-keeping constraint, which requires
c to provide the worker with the lifetime utility V , and to an individual rationality constraint,
which requires the separation probability d to be consistent with the worker’s incentives to quit.
The ﬁrm chooses c to maximize the sum of its proﬁts in the current period and its proﬁts from






y + z − wi + βEˆ s
h
(1 − di (ˆ s))
³
1 − λe˜ p(ˆ Vi (ˆ s), ˆ ψ)
´
J(ˆ Vi (ˆ s), ˆ s)
io
s.t. πi ∈ [0,1], wi ∈ R, di : Ψ × Z → [δ,1], ˆ Vi : Ψ × Z → X, for i =1 ,2,
P2
i=1 πi =1 , di (ˆ s)=
n








di (ˆ s)U( ˆ ψ)+( 1− di (ˆ s))
³




We denote the optimal policy function associated with (2.3) as c(V,s)=( πi,w i,d i, ˆ Vi)2
i=1,w h e r e
πi = πi(V,s), wi = wi(V,s), di = di(V,s,ˆ s), and ˆ Vi = ˆ Vi(V,s,ˆ s), for i =1 ,2.
2.4.2. Fixed-Wage Contracts
With ﬁxed-wage contracts, we assume that workers are risk averse; i.e., υ(w)=w for all w.
Consider a worker who is employed for a wage of w at the beginning of the production stage,
and denote as H(w,ψ) his lifetime utility. In the current period, the worker consumes w units
of output. During the next separation stage, the worker is forced to become unemployed with
probability δ, and has the option of keeping his job with probability 1−δ. If the worker becomes
unemployed, he does not have the opportunity to look for a new job during the next search stage.
If the workers keeps his job, he has the opportunity to look for a better job with probability λe.
Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility H(w,ψ)i se q u a lt o
H(w,ψ)=w + βE ˆ ψ
n
d( ˆ ψ)U( ˆ ψ)+( 1− d( ˆ ψ))
h





δ if U( ˆ ψ) ≤ H(w, ˆ ψ)+λe max
n
0,R(H(w, ˆ ψ), ˆ ψ)
o




We denote as h(V,ψ) the wage that provides an employed worker with the lifetime utility V .
That is, h(V,ψ) is the solution of the equation H(w,ψ)=V with respect to w.
Next, consider a ﬁrm that employs a worker for a wage of w at the beginning of the production
stage, and denote as K(w,s)i t sl i f e t i m ep r o ﬁt. In the current period, the ﬁrm’s proﬁti sg i v e n
by y + z − w. The discounted sum of proﬁts from the next period onward is (1 − d( ˆ ψ))(1 −
8λe˜ p(H(w, ˆ ψ), ˆ ψ))K(w,ˆ s). Therefore, K(w,s)i se q u a lt o
K(w,s)=y + z − w + βEˆ s
h





δ if U( ˆ ψ) ≤ H(w, ˆ ψ)+λe max
n
0,R(H(w, ˆ ψ), ˆ ψ)
o




Finally, consider a ﬁrm that has just met a worker in submarket x = V , and denote as
J(V,ψ,z0) its lifetime proﬁt. The ﬁrm oﬀers to the worker a two-point lottery over the constant
wage w.T h eﬁrm’s oﬀer is required to provide the worker with the lifetime utility V (if accepted).
Therefore, the ﬁrm’s lifetime proﬁt J(V,ψ,z0)i se q u a lt o
J(V,ψ,z0)= m a x
πi,˜ Vi
P2
i=1 πiK(h(˜ Vi,ψ),ψ,z 0),
s.t. πi ∈ [0,1], ˜ Vi ∈ X,f o r i =1 ,2,
P2
i=1 πi =1 ,
P2
i=1 πi˜ Vi = V.
(2.6)
We denote the optimal policy function associated with (2.6) as c =( πi, ˜ Vi)2
i=1,w h e r eπi = πi(V,s)
and ˜ Vi = ˜ Vi(V,s), for i =1 ,2.
2.5. Market Tightness
During the search stage, a ﬁr mc h o o s e sh o wm a n yv a c a n c i e st oc r e a t ea n dw h e r et ol o c a t et h e m .
The ﬁrm’s beneﬁt of creating a vacancy in submarket x is the product between the probability
of meeting a worker, q(θ(x,ψ)), and the value of meeting a worker, J(x,ψ,z0). The ﬁrm’s cost
of creating a vacancy in submarket x is k. When the beneﬁt is strictly smaller than the cost, the
ﬁrm’s optimal policy is to create no vacancies in x. When the beneﬁt is strictly greater than the
cost, the ﬁrm’s optimal policy is to create inﬁnitely many vacancies in x. And when the beneﬁt
and the cost are equal, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is independent of the number of vacancies it creates in
submarket x.
In any submarket that is visited by a positive number of workers, the tightness θ(x,ψ)i s
consistent with the ﬁrm’s optimal creation strategy if and only if
k ≥ q(θ(x,ψ))J(x,ψ,z0), (2.7)
and θ(x,ψ) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. In any submarket that workers do not visit, the
tightness θ(x,ψ) is consistent with the ﬁrm’s optimal creation strategy if and only if q(θ(x,ψ))J(x,ψ,z0)
is smaller than or equal to k. Following most of the literature on directed search, we restrict at-
tention to equilibria in which the tightness θ(x,ψ)s a t i s ﬁes condition (2.7) in all submarkets.15
15See Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Delacroix and Shi (2006), Menzio (2007), and Shi (2008).
93. Block Recursive Equilibrium: Deﬁnition and Procedure
The previous section motivates the following deﬁnition of a recursive equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 3.1. A Recursive Equilibrium consists of a market tightness function θ : X×Ψ → R+,
as e a r c hv a l u ef u n c t i o nR : X × Ψ → R,ap o l i c yf u n c t i o nm : X × Ψ → X,a nu n e m p l o y m e n t
value function U : Ψ → R,aﬁrm’s value function J : X ×Ψ×Z → R, a contract policy function
c : X × Ψ × Z → C, and a transition probability function for the aggregate state of the economy
Φ ˆ ψ : Ψ × Ψ → [0,1]. These functions satisfy the following requirements:
(i) θ satisﬁes (2.7) for all (x,ψ) ∈ X × Ψ;
(ii) R satisﬁes (2.1) for all (V,ψ) ∈ X × Ψ,a n dm is the associated policy function;
(iii) U satisﬁes (2.2) for all ψ ∈ Ψ;
(iv) J satisﬁes (2.3) or (2.6) for all (V,ψ,z) ∈ X×Ψ×Z,a n dc is the associated policy function;
(v) Φ ˆ ψ is derived from the policy functions, (m,c), and the probability distributions for (ˆ y,ˆ z).
Solving a recursive equilibrium outside of the steady-state requires solving a system of func-
tional equations in which the unknown functions depend on the entire distribution of workers
across employment states, (u,g). Since this distribution is a large dimensional object (for ex-
ample, it is an inﬁnite dimensional object in the version of the model with dynamic contracts),
solving a recursive equilibrium outside of the steady-state is a diﬃcult task both analytically and
computationally. In contrast, solving the following class of equilibria is much easier because it
involves solving a system of functional equations in which the unknown functions have at most
three dimensions.
Deﬁnition 3.2. A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) is a recursive equilibrium such that the
functions {θ,R,m,U,J,c} depend on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the
aggregate component of productivity, y, and not through the distribution of workers across em-
ployment states, (u,g).
In this paper, we establish existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium. To this aim, we deﬁne
J (X × Y × Z) (henceforth J)a st h es e to fﬁrm’s value functions J : X ×Y ×Z → R such that:
(J1) For all (y,z) ∈ Y ×Z and all V1, V2 ∈ X,w i t hV1 ≤ V2, the diﬀerence J(V2,y,z)−J(V1,y,z)
is bounded between − ¯ BJ(V2 − V1)a n d−BJ(V2 − V1), where ¯ BJ ≥ BJ > 0 are some constants;
(J2) For all (V,y,z) ∈ X × Y × Z, J(V,y,z) is bounded in [J, ¯ J];16 (J3) For all (y,z) ∈ Y × Z,
16We list this property separately in addition to (J1) to emphasize the fact that the bounds J and ¯ J are uniform
for all functions in the set J and for all (V,y,z).
10J(V,y,z)i sc o n c a v ei nV .I n w o r d s ,a ﬁrm’s value function J in the set J depends on ψ only
through y.M o r e o v e r ,aﬁrm’s value function J in the set J is bounded; it is strictly decreasing
and weakly concave in V ; and its “derivative” with respect to V is bounded above and below, i.e.
J is bi-Lipschitz continuous in V .17 In Appendix A, we prove that J is a non-empty, bounded,
closed and convex subset of the space of bounded, continuous functions on X × Y × Z,w i t ht h e
sup norm.18
In Section 4, we take an arbitrary ﬁrm’s value function J from the set J.G i v e nJ,w ep r o v e
that the market tightness function, θ, that solves the equilibrium condition (2.7) depends on
the state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y, and not
through the distribution of workers across employment states, (u,g). Intuitively, since the value
of ﬁlling a vacancy in submarket x does not depend on the distribution of workers and the cost
of creating a vacancy is constant, the equilibrium probability of ﬁlling a vacancy in submarket x,
and hence the tightness of submarket x, must be independent of the distribution of workers.
Given θ, we prove that the search value function, R, that solves the equilibrium condition
(2.1) depends on ψ only through y.I n t u i t i v e l y ,R does not depend on (u,g), because neither the
probability that a worker ﬁnds a job in submarket x nor the beneﬁtt oaw o r k e rf r o mﬁnding a
j o bi ns u b m a r k e tx depends on the employment status of other workers in the economy. Given
R, we prove that the unemployment value function, U, that solves the equilibrium condition
(2.2) depends on ψ only through y.I n t u i t i v e l y , U does not depend on (u,g), because neither
the output of an unemployed worker nor his return to searching depends on the distribution of
w o r k e r sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent employment states.
In Section 5, we insert J, θ, R,a n dU in the RHS of the equilibrium condition (2.3) to
construct an update of the ﬁrm’s value function, where T maps the function J with which the
above procedure starts into a new function. First, we prove that TJ depends on ψ only through
y.I n t u i t i v e l y ,TJ does not depend on (u,g) because the output of a match in the current period,
the probability that a match survives until the next production stage, and the value to the ﬁrm
of a match at the next production stage are all independent of the distribution of workers across
employment states. Second, we prove that TJis bounded between J and ¯ J; it is strictly decreasing
and weakly concave in V ; and its “derivative” with respect to V is bounded between − ¯ BJ and
17A function J (x)i sL i p s c h i t zo v e rx ∈ X if |J(x2) − J (x1)| ≤ B1 |x2 − x1| for all x1,x 2 ∈ X,w h e r eB1 is a
ﬁnite constant. The function is bi-Lipschitz if, in addition, |J(x2) − J (x1)| ≥ B2 |x2 − x1| for all x1,x 2 ∈ X,w h e r e
B2 is a strictly positive constant. We need the ﬁrm’s value function J to be bi-Lipschitz in order to ensure the set
J to be closed and convex. In addition, bi-Lipschitz continuity implies that J is strictly decreasing, a property
that will be used to establish important properties such as those of the market tightness.
18Throughout this paper, the norm is the sup norm unless it is speciﬁed otherwise.
11−BJ. Intuitively, the ﬁrm’s updated value function, TJ, is bounded because the output of the
match is bounded and there is time discounting; TJ is decreasing because a ﬁrm ﬁnds it costly to
provide a worker with higher lifetime utility; TJ is concave because the contract between a ﬁrm
and a worker includes a lottery; and the “derivative” of TJ is bounded because the derivative of
the worker’s utility function is bounded. Third, we prove that TJ is continuous in J.
From the ﬁrst two properties of TJ above, it follows that the equilibrium operator T maps
the set of ﬁrm’s value functions J into itself. From the third property of TJ, it follows that the
equilibrium operator T is continuous in J. From bi-Lipschitz continuity of TJ, it follows that
the family of functions T(J) is equicontinuous. Overall, the equilibrium operator T satisﬁes the
assumptions of Schauder’s ﬁxed point theorem (see Stokey and Lucas with Prescott, 1989), and,
hence, there exists a J∗ ∈ J such that J∗ = TJ∗. Applying one more time the above procedure
that leads to the mapping T, but with the ﬁrm’s value function J∗, we can construct equilibrium
policy functions θ∗, R∗, m∗, U∗,a n dc∗. These functions and J∗ constitute a Block Recursive
Equilibrium for the version of the model with dynamic contracts. In Section 6, we use a similar
argument to prove existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium for the version of the model with
ﬁxed-wage contracts.
4. General Properties of an Equilibrium
4.1. Market Tightness
Start with an arbitrary value function of the ﬁrm, J ∈ J, we construct the market tightness
function and analyze its properties. For all (x,ψ) ∈ X ×Ψ such that J(x,y,z0) ≥ k,t h es o l u t i o n
to the equilibrium condition (2.7) is given by a market tightness of q−1(k/J(x,y,z0)), where
q−1(k/J(x,y,z0)) is bounded between 0 and ¯ θ ≡ q−1(k/ ¯ J). For all (x,ψ) ∈ X × Ψ such that
J(x,y,z0) <k , the solution to the equilibrium condition (2.7) is given by a market tightness of 0.
The condition J(x,y,z0) ≥ k is satisﬁed if and only if x ≤ ˜ x(y), where ˜ x(y) is the solution to the
equation J(x,y,z0) <kwith respect to x. From these observations, it follows that the function
θ : X × Y → [0, ¯ θ]d e ﬁned as
θ(x,y)=
(
q−1(k/J(x,y,z0)), if x ≤ ˜ x(y),
0, else,
(4.1)
is the unique solution to the equilibrium condition (2.7) for all (x,ψ) ∈ X × Ψ.
T h em a r k e tt i g h t n e s sf u n c t i o n ,θ, has several properties. First, θ depends on the aggregate
state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y, and not
through the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states, (u,g). Second, the market
12tightness function, θ, is strictly decreasing with respect to x. Intuitively, since the ﬁrm’s value
from ﬁlling a vacancy is lower in a submarket with a higher x,t h eﬁrm’s probability of ﬁlling
a vacancy must be higher. Third, the market tightness function, θ, is Lipschitz continuous in
x for all x, and bi-Lipschitz in x for x<˜ x(y). Intuitively, since the ﬁrm’s value function, J,
is bi-Lipschitz continuous in x and the derivative of the function q−1(.) is bounded, the market
tightness function deﬁned in (4.1) is also bi-Lipschitz continuous for all such x that θ(x,y) > 0.
Finally, the probability that a worker meets a vacancy in submarket x, p(θ(x,y)), decreases at
an increasing rate as x increases. This property follows from the concavity of the ﬁrm’s value
function J and of the composite function p(q−1(.)). These properties of θ a r es u m m a r i z e di nt h e
following lemma and proved in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.1. (i) For all y ∈ Y , the market tightness function, θ, is such that
¯ BJ
q0(¯ θ)k
(x2 − x1) ≤ θ(x2,y) − θ(x1,y) ≤
BJk
q0(0) ¯ J2(x2 − x1),i f x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ˜ x(y),
¯ BJ
q0(¯ θ)k
(x2 − x1) ≤ θ(x2,y) − θ(x1,y) ≤ 0,i f x1 ≤ ˜ x(y) ≤ x2,
θ(x2,y) − θ(x1,y)=0 ,i f ˜ x(y) ≤ x1 ≤ x2,
(4.2)
where BJ and ¯ BJ are the bi-Lipschitz bounds on all functions in J. (ii) For all y ∈ Y and all
x ∈ [x, ˜ x(y)], the composite function p(θ(x,y)) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave in x.
The function θ(x,y) constructed above depends on the arbitrary function J.C o n s i d e r t w o
arbitrary functions Jn, Jr ∈ J.L e t θn denote the market tightness function computed with
Jn,a n dθr with Jr. In the following lemma, we prove that, if the distance between Jn and Jr
converges to zero, so does the distance between θn and θr. That is, we prove that the market
tightness function, θ, is continuous with respect to the ﬁrm’s value function J with which it is
computed. This result will be used in Sections 5 and 6 to establish that the equilibrium operator
T is continuous.
Lemma 4.2. For any ρ>0 and any Jn, Jr ∈ J,i fkJn − Jrk <ρ ,t h e n





Proof: For the sake of brevity, let us suppress the dependence of various functions on (y,z).
Let ρ>0 be an arbitrary real number. Let Jn and Jr be arbitrary functions in J such that
kJn − Jrk <ρ .L e t y be an arbitrary point in Y . From property (J1) of the set J,i tf o l l o w s
13that Jr(x + B−1
J ρ) − Jr(x) ≤− ρ and, hence, Jr(x) − ρ ≥ Jr(x + B−1
J ρ). From property (J1), it
also follows that Jr(x) − Jr(x − B−1
J ρ) ≤− ρ and, hence, Jr(x)+ρ ≤ Jr(x − B−1
J ρ). From these
observations and kJn − Jrk <ρ , it follows that
Jn(x) <J r(x)+ρ ≤ Jr(x − B−1
J ρ),
Jn(x) >J r(x) − ρ ≥ Jr(x + B−1
J ρ).
(4.4)
From the ﬁrst line in (4.4) and equation (4.1), it follows that θn(x) ≤ θr(x − B−1
J ρ). Similarly,
from the second line in (4.4) and equation (4.1), it follows that θn(x) ≥ θr(x + B−1
J ρ). Hence,
θn(x) − θr(x) <θ r(x − B−1
J ρ) − θr(x) ≤ αθρ,
θn(x) − θr(x) >θ r(x + B−1
J ρ) − θr(x) ≥− αθρ,
where αθ is deﬁn e di n( 4 . 3 ) .T h u s ,|θn (x) − θr (x)| ≤ αθρ. Since this result holds for all (x,y,z) ∈
X × Y × Z, we conclude that kθn − θrk <α θρ. ¥
4.2. Search Problem
Given the ﬁrm’s value function J ∈ J, the market tightness function θ deﬁned in (4.1) sat-
isﬁes the equilibrium condition (2.7). Given θ, the search value function, R,t h a ts a t i s ﬁes
the equilibrium condition (2.1) is equal to maxx∈X f(x,V,y) for all (x,ψ) ∈ X × Ψ,w h e r e
f(x,V,y) ≡ p(θ(x,y))(x − V ). Note that, for all (V,ψ) ∈ X × Ψ, the objective function, f,
depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, through the aggregate component of produc-
tivity, y, and not through the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states, (u,g).
Also, note that the choice set, X, is independent of the aggregate state of the economy, ψ.F r o m
these observations, it follows that the optimal search decision and the search value function, R,
depend on ψ only through y and not through (u,g).
Given θ, a search policy function satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (2.1) if its value belongs
to argmaxx∈X f(x,V,y) for all (V,ψ) ∈ X × Ψ.F o ra l l( V,ψ) ∈ X × Ψ, the objective function,
f, is negative for all x in the interval [x,V], strictly positive for all x in the interval (V,˜ x(y)),
and equal to zero for all x in the interval [˜ x(y), ¯ x]. Moreover, the objective function is strictly
concave in x for all x in the interval (V,˜ x(y)) (Shi, 2008, Lemma 3.1). Therefore, if V<˜ x(y),
the argmax is unique and belongs to the interval (V,˜ x(y)). If V ≥ ˜ x(y), the argmax includes any




argmaxx∈X f(x,V,y), if V< x (y),
V, else,
(4.5)
14is the unique solution to the equilibrium condition (2.1).
In Lemma 4.3, we prove that the search value function, R, is decreasing in V .I n t u i t i v e l y ,
since the value to a worker from ﬁnding a job in submarket x is decreasing in the value of his
current employment position, V , and the probability that a worker ﬁnds a job in submarket x is
independent of V , the return to search is decreasing in V . Also, in Lemma 4.3, we prove that the
search policy function, m,i si n c r e a s i n gi nV . Intuitively, since the marginal rate of substitution
between the value oﬀered by a new job and the probability of ﬁnding a new job is decreasing in V ,
the optimal search strategy is increasing in V . Monotonicity of m in V implies that the workers
choose to separate themselves into diﬀerent submarkets in job search. Moreover, in Lemmas 4.3
and 4.3, we prove that the search value and policy functions are Lipschitz continuous in V .T h e s e
results will be used in Sections 5 and 6 to prove that the equilibrium operator T is continuous.
Lemma 4.3. For all y ∈ Y and all V1, V2 ∈ X, V1 ≤ V2, the search value function, R,i ss u c h
that
−(V2 − V1) ≤ R(V2,y) − R(V1,y) ≤ 0, (4.6)
and the search policy function, m, is such that
0 ≤ m(V2,y) − m(V1,y) ≤ V2 − V1. (4.7)
Proof: For the sake of brevity, let us suppress the dependence of the functions θ,˜ x, m and p
on y.L e tV1 and V2 be two arbitrary points in X,w i t hV1 ≤ V2. The diﬀerence R(V2) − R(V1)
is such that
R(V2) − R(V1) ≤ f(m(V2),V 2) − f(m(V2),V 1) ≤− p(θ(m(V2)))(V2 − V1) ≤ 0,
R(V2) − R(V1) ≥ f(m(V1),V 2) − f(m(V1),V 1) ≥− p(θ(m(V1)))(V2 − V1) ≥− (V2 − V1).
where the ﬁrst inequality in both lines makes use of the fact that R(Vi)i se q u a lt of(m(Vi),V i)
and greater than f(m(V−i),V i)w h e r e−i 6= i and i,−i =1 ,2. Thus, (4.6) holds.
Turn to (4.7). If V1 ≥ ˜ x,t h e nm(V2)=V2 and m(V1)=V1. In this case, (4.7) clearly holds. If
V2 ≥ ˜ x ≥ V1,t h e nm(V2)=V2 and m(V1) ∈ (V1, ˜ x). Also in this case, (4.7) holds.
Now, consider the remaining case where V1 ≤ V2 < ˜ x.S i n c e f(m(V1),V 1) ≥ f(m(V2),V 1)a n d
f(m(V2),V 2) ≥ f(m(V1),V 2), we have
0 ≥ f(m(V2),V 1) − f(m(V1),V 1)+f(m(V1),V 2) − f(m(V2),V 2)
= p(θ(m(V2)))(V2 − V1) − p(θ(m(V1)))(V2 − V1)
=[ p(θ(m(V2))) − p(θ(m(V1)))](V2 − V1).
15Since p(θ(x)) is decreasing in x, the previous inequality implies that m(V2) − m(V1) ≥ 0.
If m(V2) − m(V1)=0 ,( 4 . 7 )h o l d s .I fm(V2) − m(V1) > 0, let ∆ be an arbitrary real number in
the open interval between 0 and (m(V2) − m(V1))/2. Using the deﬁnition of R, we can deduce
from the inequality f(m(V1),V 1) ≥ f(m(V1)+∆,V 1) the following result:




Similarly, because f(m(V2),V 2) ≥ f(m(V2) − ∆,V 2), we have
m(V2) − V2 ≤
p(θ(m(V2) − ∆))∆
p(θ(m(V2) − ∆)) − p(θ(m(V2)))
.
Recall that the function p(θ(x)) is decreasing and concave in x for all x ≤ ˜ x(y). Since m(V1)+
∆ ≤ m(V2) − ∆,t h e np(θ(m(V1)+∆)) ≥ p(θ(m(V2) − ∆)). Similarly, since m(V1) <m (V2),
p(θ(m(V1))) − p(θ(m(V1)+∆)) ≤ p(θ(m(V2) − ∆)) − p(θ(m(V2))). From these observations and
the inequalities above, it follows that m(V2) − m(V1) ≤ V2 − V1. Hence, (4.7) holds. ¥
Now we turn to the composite function ˜ p(V,y)=p(θ(m(V,y),y)). The probability ˜ p(V,y)i s
the probability that an employed worker ﬁnds a new job during the matching stage, given that
his current job gives him the lifetime utility V and the aggregate component of productivity is y.
The following corollary states that the function ˜ p(V,y) is decreasing and Lipschitz continuous in
V :
Corollary 4.4. For all y ∈ Y and all V1,V 2 ∈ X, V1 ≤ V2, the quitting probability ˜ p is such that
− ¯ Bp(V2 − V1) ≤ ˜ p(V2,y) − ˜ p(V1,y) ≤− Bp (V2 − V1), (4.8)




> 0 and Bp =0 .
Proof:L e ty be an arbitrary point in Y ,a n dl e tV1, V2 be two points in X with V1 ≤ V2.F r o m
Lemma 4.3, it follows that the diﬀerence m(V2,y) − m(V1,y) is greater than 0 and smaller than
V2 − V1. From Lemma 4.1, it follows that the diﬀerence θ(m(V2,y),y) − θ(m(V2,y),y)i sg r e a t e r




and smaller than 0. Finally, since p is a concave function of θ,t h e





(V2 − V1) ≤ p(θ(m(V2,y),y)) − p(θ(m(V1,y),y)) ≤ 0.
These are the bounds in (4.8). ¥
Now, consider two arbitrary functions Jn, Jr ∈ J.L e t θn denote the market tightness
function computed with Jn, Rn and mn the search value and policy functions computed with
16θn,a n d˜ pn (V,y) the composite function p(θn(mn(V,y),y)). Similarly, let θr denote the market
tightness function computed with Jr, Rr and mr the search value and policy functions computed
with θr,a n d˜ pr (V,y) the composite function p(θr(mr(V,y),y)). In the following lemma, we prove
that, if the distance between Jn and Jr converges to zero, so does the distance between Rn and
Rr and the distance between ˜ pn and ˜ pr. That is, we prove that the search value function R and
the separation probability ˜ p are continuous with respect to the ﬁrm’s value function J.T h e s e
results will be used in Sections 5 and 6 to establish that the equilibrium operator T is continuous.
Lemma 4.5. For any ρ>0 and any Jn, Jr ∈ J,i fkJn − Jrk <ρ ,t h e n
kRn − Rrk <α Rρ, αR ≡ p0(0)αθ(¯ x − x), (4.9)
k˜ pn − ˜ prk <α p (ρ), αp (ρ) ≡ max{2 ¯ Bpρ1/2 + p0 (0)αθρ,2αRρ1/2}. (4.10)
As ρ → 0, αp (ρ) → 0.
Proof: For the sake of brevity, let us suppress the dependence of various functions on V and
y.L e tρ>0 be an arbitrary real number. Let Jn and Jr be arbitrary functions in J such that
kJn − Jrk <ρ .L e t( V,y) be an arbitrary point in X × Y . The distance between Rn(V,y)a n d
Rr(V,y) is such that
|Rn − Rr| ≤ max
x∈X




















(¯ x − x) <p 0(0)αθ(¯ x − x)ρ,
where the last inequality makes use of the bounds in (4.3). Since this result holds for all (V,y) ∈
X × Y , we conclude that kRn − Rrk <α Rρ.
Now, consider the function ˜ p. Without loss of generality, assume mr(V,y) ≤ mn(V,y). (If
mr (V,y) >m n (V,y), just switch the roles of mn and mr in the proof below.) First, consider the
case where p(θr(mr)) ≤ p(θn(mn)). In this case, the distance between p(θn(mn)) and p(θr(mr))
is such that
(0 ≤) p(θn (mn)) − p(θr (mr)) ≤ p(θn (mr)) − p(θr (mr)) <p 0 (0)αθρ,
where the ﬁrst inequality makes use of the fact that p(θn(x)) is decreasing in x and mn ≥ mr,
and the second inequality makes use of the bounds in (4.3).
17Second, consider the case where p(θr(mr)) >p (θn(mn)) and mn − 2ρ1/2 ≤ mr ≤ mn.I n t h i s
case, the distance between p(θn(mn)) and p(θr(mr)) is such that
(0 <) p(θr (mr)) − p(θn (mn))
= p(θr (mr)) − p(θr (mn)) + p(θr (mn)) − p(θn (mn))
< 2 ¯ Bpρ1/2 + p0 (0)αθρ,
where the last inequality makes use of the bounds in (4.8) and in (4.3). Note that this bound is
larger than the one in the previous case.
Finally, consider the remaining case where p(θr(mr)) >p (θn(mn)) and mr <m n − 2ρ1/2 <m n.
First, note that mr ≥ V ,b e c a u s emr ∈ (V,˜ xr)i fV<˜ xr,a n dmr = V if V ≥ ˜ xr. This observation
implies that mn >V+ ρ1/2, because if mn ≤ V + ρ1/2 then mr <V− ρ1/2 <V,w h i c hi sa
contradiction. Second, note that mn >V implies mn < ˜ xn, because mn ∈ (V,˜ xn)i fV<˜ xn,a n d
mn = V if V ≥ ˜ xn. This observation implies that mn < ˜ xn.
Note that p(θn(mn))(mn − V ) ≥ p(θn(mn − ρ1/2))(mn − ρ1/2 − V ), because mn is the optimal
search decision when J = Jn. Therefore, we have
p(θn(mn))ρ1/2 ≥
£
p(θn(mn − ρ1/2)) − p(θn(mn))
¤¡




p(θn(mr)) − p(θn(mr + ρ1/2))
¤¡




p(θn(mr)) − p(θn(mr + ρ1/2))
¤¡
mr + ρ1/2 − V
¢
.
To obtain the second inequality we have used the facts that p(θn(x)) is concave in x for all
x ∈ [x, ˜ xn], that mr+ρ1/2 <m n < ˜ xn,a n dt h a tmn−ρ1/2−V> 0. To obtain the third inequality
we have used the facts that mr + ρ1/2 <m n − ρ1/2,a n dt h a tp(θn(mr)) − p(θn(mr + ρ1/2)) > 0.




p(θr(mr)) − p(θr(mr + ρ1/2))
i³
mr + ρ1/2 − V
´
.
Subtracting this inequality from the previous result and dividing by ρ1/2,w eo b t a i n
(0 <) p(θr(mr)) − p(θn(mn))
≤ ρ−1/2 £
p(θr(mr)) − p(θn(mr)) + p(θn(mr + ρ1/2)) − p(θr(mr + ρ1/2))
¤¡
mr + ρ1/2 − V
¢
< 2p0(0)αθρ1/2 (¯ x − x)=2 αRρ,
where the last line makes use of the fact that the distance between p(θr(m)) and p(θn(m)) is
smaller than p0(0)αθρ,a n dt h a tmr + ρ1/2 − V is smaller than ¯ x − x.
Overall, we have established that the distance between p(θr(mr)) and p(θn(mn)) is such that
|p(θr(mr)) − p(θn(mn))| < max{2 ¯ Bpρ1/2 + p0 (0)αθρ,2αRρ1/2} = αp(ρ)
Since this result holds for all (V,y) ∈ X × Y , we conclude that ||˜ pr − ˜ pn|| <α p(ρ). ¥
184.3. Unemployment Value
Given the ﬁrm’s value function J ∈ J, the solution to the equilibrium condition (2.7) is the
market tightness, θ,d e ﬁned in (4.1). Given θ, the solution to the equilibrium condition (2.1) is
the search value function, R,d e ﬁned as R(V,y)=m a x x∈X f(x,V,y). Given R, an unemployment
value function is a solution to the equilibrium condition (2.2) if and only if it is a ﬁxed point of
the mapping TU deﬁned as
(TUϕ)(ψ)=υ(b)+βE ˆ ψ
n
ϕ( ˆ ψ)+λu max{0,R(ϕ( ˆ ψ), ˆ y)}
o
. (4.11)
In the next lemma, we prove that there exists a unique ﬁxed point of the mapping TU within
the set C(Y ) of bounded continuous functions ϕ : Y → R. Therefore, there exists a unique
unemployment value function, U ∈ C(Y ), that satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (2.2), and that
depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of
productivity, y, but not through the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states,
(u,g).





,w h e r eU =( 1− β)−1υ(b) >xand ¯ U = υ(b)+β¯ x<¯ x.
Proof: In Appendix C. ¥
Now, consider two arbitrary functions Jn, Jr ∈ J.L e tθn denote the market tightness function
computed with Jn, Rn the search value function computed with θn,a n dUn the unemployment
value function computed with Rn. Similarly, let θr denote the market tightness function computed
with Jr, Rr the search value function computed with θr,a n dUr the unemployment value function
computed with Rr. In the following lemma, we prove that, if the distance between Jn and Jr
converges to zero, so does the distance between Un and Ur.
Lemma 4.7. For any ρ>0 and any Jn, Jr ∈ J,i fkJn − Jrk <ρ ,t h e n
kUn − Urk <α Uρ, αU ≡ βλuαR/(1 − β). (4.12)
Proof: For the sake of brevity, let us suppress the dependence of various functions on ˆ y.L e tρ>0
be an arbitrary real number. Let Jn and Jr be arbitrary functions in J such that kJn − Jrk <ρ .
Let y be an arbitrary point in Y . The distance between Un(y)a n dUr(y) is such that
|Un(y) − Ur(y)|
≤ βEˆ y {|[Un + λuRn(Un)] − [Ur + λu maxRn(Ur)]| + λu |Rn(Ur) − Rr(Ur)|}
<β kUn − Urk + βλuαRρ.
19To obtain the second inequality we have used the fact that the distance between Un +λuRn(Un)
and Un+λuRn(Un) is smaller than the distance between Un and Ur. Since the above result holds
for all y ∈ Y , it follows that kUn − Urk <α uρ. ¥
5. Block Recursive Equilibrium with Dynamic Contracts
5.1. Updated Value Function of the Firm
In the previous section, we have chosen an arbitrary ﬁrm’s value function, J ∈ J.G i v e nJ,w e
have computed the market tightness function, θ,t h a ts a t i s ﬁes the equilibrium condition (2.7).
Given θ, we have computed the search value and policy functions, R and m,t h a ts a t i s f yt h e
equilibrium condition (2.1). Given R, we have computed the unemployment value function, U,
that satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (2.2). In this section, we insert J, θ, R, m and U into the
right hand side of the equilibrium condition (2.3) to compute an update, ˜ J,o ft h eﬁrm’s value








y + z − wi + βEˆ s
h
(1 − di (ˆ y,ˆ z))(1 − λe˜ p(ˆ Vi (ˆ y,ˆ z), ˆ y))J(ˆ Vi (ˆ y,ˆ z), ˆ y,ˆ z)
io
s.t. πi ∈ [0,1], wi ∈ R, di : Y × Z → [δ,1], ˆ Vi : Y × Z → X, for i =1 ,2,
P2
i=1 πi =1 , di (ˆ y,ˆ z)=
n












The updated value function of the ﬁrm, ˜ J, has four important properties. First, ˜ J depends
on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity,
y, and not through the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states, (u,g). This
property follows immediately from the fact that both the objective function and the choice set on
the right hand side of (5.1) depend on y but not on (u,g). Second, the updated value function, ˜ J,
is bi-Lipschitz continuous in V . More speciﬁcally, for all (y,z) ∈ Y × Z and all V1, V2 ∈ X,w i t h
V1 ≤ V2, the diﬀerence ˜ J(V2,y,z)− ˜ J(V1,y,z) is bounded between −(V2−V1)/υ0 and −(V2−V1)/¯ υ0




, where the bounds J and
19In a Block Recursive Equilibrium, the distribution of workers across employment states in the next period,
(ˆ u, ˆ g), is uniquely determined by the realization of the aggregate component of productivity in the next period,
ˆ y, and by the state of the economy in the current period, ψ. Therefore, in the contracting problem (5.1), next
period’s separation probability, di,a n dc o n t i n u a t i o nv a l u e ,ˆ Vi, can be written as functions of ˆ y only.
20¯ J are independent of J and ˜ J (see (5.2) below). Finally, ˜ J is concave in V , as a result of the use
of the lottery in the contract (see part (iii) in the proof of Lemma 5.1).





¯ υ0,−J = ¯ J =m a x
(¯ ¯¯ y +¯ z − υ−1(x − β¯ x)
¯ ¯
1 − β(1 − δ)
,
¯ ¯y + z − υ−1(¯ x − βx)
¯ ¯
1 − β(1 − δ)
)
. (5.2)
With these bounds, ˜ J satisﬁes conditions (J1)-(J3) and, hence, belongs to the set J, as stated in
the next lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Set the bounds BJ, ¯ BJ, J,a n d ¯ J as in (5.2). Then, the updated value function,
˜ J, belongs to the set J.
Proof: For all (V,y,z) ∈ X × Y × Z, ˜ J(V,y,z)i se q u a lt om a x γ∈Γ F(γ,V,y,z), where γ is
deﬁned as the tuple (π1, ˜ V1, ˆ V1, ˆ V2); Γ is deﬁned as the set of γ’s such that π1 ∈ [0,1), ˜ V1 ∈ R,





y + z − wi + βEˆ s
h
(1 − di (ˆ y,ˆ z))(1 − λe˜ p(ˆ Vi (ˆ y,ˆ z), ˆ y))J(ˆ Vi (ˆ y,ˆ z), ˆ y,ˆ z)
io
,
s.t. π2 =1− π1, ˜ V2 =( V − π1˜ V1)/π2,
di(ˆ y,ˆ z)=
n





˜ Vi − βEˆ s
h


















( i )F i r s t ,w ew a n tt op r o v et h a t ˜ J satisﬁes property (J1) of the set J.T ot h i sa i m ,l e t( y,z)b ea n
arbitrary point in Y ×Z,a n dl e tV1, V2 be two points in X with V1 ≤ V2. The distance between
˜ J(V2,y,z)a n d ˜ J(V1,y,z) is such that
¯ ¯ ¯ ˜ J(V2,y,z) − ˜ J(V1,y,z)










V1 |F0(γ,t,y,z)|dt ≤ |V2 − V1|/υ0.
The inequality above implies that the function ˜ J is Lipschitz continuous in V . Therefore, it
is absolutely continuous and almost everywhere diﬀerentiable with respect to V (see Royden,
211988, page 112). The function F is diﬀerentiable with respect to V . Therefore, at any point of
diﬀerentiability, the derivative of ˜ J with respect to V is equal to F0(γ∗(V,y,z),V,y,z), where
γ∗(V,y,z) belongs to argmaxγ∈Γ F(γ,V,y,z) (see Milgrom and Segal, 2003, Theorem 1). From
these properties of ˜ J, it follows that the diﬀerence ˜ J(V2,y,z) − ˜ J(V1,y,z) is such that












(ii) Next, we want to prove that ˜ J satisﬁes property (J2) of the set J.T ot h i sa i m ,l e t( V,y,z)
be an arbitrary point in X × Y × Z.A l s o , l e t γ0 denote the tuple (π1,0, ˜ V1,0, ˆ V1,0, ˆ V2,0), where
π1,0 =0 , ˜ V1,0 =¯ x, ˆ V1,0 = ˆ V2,0 = x.T h eﬁrm’s value ˜ J(V,y,z) is such that
˜ J(V,y,z) ≤ ¯ y +¯ z + βδ ¯ J − min(πi,˜ Vi)
nP2
i=1 πiυ−1(˜ Vi − β¯ x),s.t.
P2
i=1 πi˜ Vi = V
o
≤ ¯ y +¯ z + βδ ¯ J − υ−1(x − β¯ x) ≤ ¯ J,
where the ﬁrst inequality makes use of the bounds on y, z, w and J, and the second inequality
makes use of the convexity of υ−1(.). Also, the ﬁrm’s value ˜ J(V,y,z) is such that
˜ J(V,y,z) ≥ F(γ0,V,y,z) ≥ y + z − υ−1(¯ x − βx)+βδJ ≥ J,
where the ﬁrst inequality makes use of the fact that γ0 belongs to Γ, and the second inequality
makes use of the bounds on y,z,w and J.
(iii) In Appendix F, we prove that ˜ J is concave with respect to V . Hence, ˜ J satisﬁes property
(J3) of the set J. ¥
Now, consider two arbitrary functions Jn, Jr ∈ J.L e t θn, Rn,˜ pn, Un, Fn and ˜ Jn denote
the functions computed with Jn. Similarly, let θr, Rr,˜ pr, Ur, Fr and ˜ Jr denote the functions
computed with Jr ∈ J. The next lemma proves that as the distance between Jn and Jr converges
to zero, the distance between ˜ Jn and ˜ Jr converges to zero as well. That is, the mapping T is
continuous.
Lemma 5.2. For any ρ>0 and any Jn, Jr ∈ J,i fkJn − Jrk <ρ ,t h e n
k ˜ Jn − ˜ Jrk <β λ eαp (ρ) ¯ J + αJρ, (5.4)
where




1+ ¯ BJαˆ V
¢
+ λe ¯ Bpαˆ V ¯ J
¤
,
αˆ V ≡ (λeαR + αU +1 ) /(1 − λe), αw ≡ β
¡
αU + αˆ V + λeαR
¢
/υ0.
22Proof: For the sake of brevity, suppress the dependence of various functions on (ˆ y,ˆ z). Let ρ>0
be an arbitrary real number. Let Jn and Jr be arbitrary functions in J such that kJn − Jrk <
ρ.L e t ( V,y,z) to an arbitrary point in X × Y × Z. Without loss in generality, assume that
˜ Jn(V,y,z) ≤ ˜ Jr(V,y,z). (If ˜ Jn(V,y,z) > ˜ Jr(V,y,z), just switch the roles of ˜ Jn and ˜ Jr in the
proof below).
Denote as γr =( π1,r, ˜ V1,r, ˆ V1,r, ˆ V2,r) a tuple such that γr ∈ Γ and Fr(γr,V,y,z)= ˜ Jr(V,y,z). Also,
denote as wi,r and di,r the wage and the separation probability implied by (5.3) for F(γ,V,y,z)=





ˆ Vi,r,i f[ˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) − Un][ˆ Vi,r + λeRr(ˆ Vi,r) − Ur] > 0,
Un − λeRn(ˆ Vi,n)+ρ,i fˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) ≤ Un, ˆ Vi,r + λeRr(ˆ Vi,r) ≥ Ur,
Un − λeRn(ˆ Vi,n) − ρ,i fˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) ≥ Un, ˆ Vi,r + λeRr(ˆ Vi,r) <U r.
(5.5)
Let wi,n and di,n denote the wage and separation probability implied by (5.3) for F(γ,V,y,z)=
Fn(γn,V,y,z). Note that (5.5) implies di,n = di,r.
First, we want to bound the distance ||ˆ Vi,n − ˆ Vi,r||.T o t h i s a i m , l e t ( ˆ y,ˆ z) denote an arbitrary
point in Y × Z. Consider the case in which ˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) − Un has the same sign as ˆ Vi,r +
λeRr(ˆ Vi,r)−Ur.I nt h i sc a s e ,ˆ Vi,n = ˆ Vi,r and, hence, ||ˆ Vi,n − ˆ Vi,r|| <α ˆ V ρ. Next, consider the case
in which ˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) − Un has a diﬀerent sign from ˆ Vi,r + λeRr(ˆ Vi,r) − Ur. In this case, the
absolute value of ˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) − Un is such that
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) − Un
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) − Un − (ˆ Vi,r + λeRr(ˆ Vi,r) − Ur)
¯ ¯ ¯
≤ (λeαR + αU)ρ,
(5.6)
where the second inequality makes use of the bounds in (4.9) and (4.12). Moreover, the absolute
value of ˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) − Un is such that
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) − Un
¯ ¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ Vi,r + λeRn(ˆ Vi,r) − Un − (ˆ Vi,n + λeRn(ˆ Vi,n) − Un)
¯ ¯ ¯ − ρ
≥ (1 − λe)
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ Vi,r − ˆ Vi,n
¯ ¯ ¯ − ρ,
(5.7)
where the equality makes use of the deﬁnition of ˆ Vi,n in (5.5), and the inequality makes use of
the bounds in (4.6). From (5.6) and (5.7), it follows that (0 <) ˆ Vi,n − ˆ Vi,r <α ˆ V ρ and, hence,
|ˆ Vi,n − ˆ Vi,r| <α ˆ V ρ. Since these results hold for all (ˆ y,ˆ z) ∈ Y × Z,w eh a v e
||ˆ Vi,n − ˆ Vi,r|| <α ˆ V ρ. (5.8)
Second, we want to bound the distance |wi,r − wi,n|. From the deﬁnitions of wi,r and wi,n,i t
23follows that υ(wi,r)a n dυ(wi,n)a r e
υ(wi,r)= ˜ Vi,r − βEˆ s
h
di,rUr +( 1− di,r)(ˆ Vi,r + λeRr(ˆ Vi,r))
i
,
υ(wi,n)= ˜ Vi,n − βEˆ s
h
di,nUn +( 1− di,n)(ˆ Vi,n + λeRn(ˆ Vi,n))
i
= ˜ Vi,r − βEˆ s
h
di,rUn +( 1− di,r)(ˆ Vi,n + λeRn(ˆ Vi,n))
i
,
where the last line makes use of the fact that, by construction, ˜ Vi,n = ˜ Vi,r and di,n = di,r.F r o m
the previous equations, it follows that the distance between υ(wi,n)a n dυ(wi,r) is such that
|υ(wi,n) − υ(wi,r)| ≥ υ0 |wi,n − wi,r|,
|υ(wi,n) − υ(wi,r)| ≤ βEˆ s
n
|Un − Ur| +
¯ ¯ ¯
h























where the last inequality makes use of the bounds in (4.12), (5.8) and (4.9). Taken together, the
two inequalities in (5.9) imply that
|wi,n − wi,r| <α wρ. (5.10)
Third, we want to bound the distance between (1−λe˜ pn(ˆ Vi,n))Jn(ˆ Vi,n)a n d( 1−λe˜ pr(ˆ Vi,r))Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
To this aim, note that the distance between Jn(ˆ Vi,n)a n dJr(ˆ Vi,r) is such that
¯ ¯ ¯Jn(ˆ Vi,n) − Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤
¯ ¯ ¯Jn(ˆ Vi,n) − Jn(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯ +
¯ ¯ ¯Jn(ˆ Vi,r) − Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯ <
¡
1+ ¯ BJαˆ V
¢
ρ, (5.11)
where the last inequality makes use of the bounds in (5.8). Also, note that the distance between
˜ pn(ˆ Vi,n)Jn(ˆ Vi,n)a n d˜ pr(ˆ Vi,r)Jr(ˆ Vi,r) is such that
¯ ¯ ¯˜ pn(ˆ Vi,n)Jn(ˆ Vi,n) − ˜ pr(ˆ Vi,r)Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯
≤ ˜ pn(ˆ Vi,n)
¯ ¯ ¯Jn(ˆ Vi,n) − Jr(ˆ Vi,n)
¯ ¯ ¯ +˜ pn(ˆ Vi,n)
¯ ¯ ¯Jr(ˆ Vi,n) − Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯
+
¯ ¯ ¯Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯˜ pn(ˆ Vi,n) − ˜ pn(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯ +
¯ ¯ ¯Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯




1+ ¯ BJαˆ V + ¯ Bpαˆ V ¯ J
¢
ρ + αp (ρ) ¯ J,
(5.12)
where we have used Lemma 4.10 to bound the last diﬀerence. From (5.11) and (5.12), it follows
that ¯ ¯ ¯(1 − λe˜ pn(ˆ Vi,n))Jn(ˆ Vi,n) − (1 − λe˜ pr(ˆ Vi,r))Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯
≤
¯ ¯ ¯Jn(ˆ Vi,n) − Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯ + λe
¯ ¯ ¯˜ pn(ˆ Vi,n)Jn(ˆ Vi,n) − ˜ pr(ˆ Vi,r)Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯
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24Finally, we want to bound the distance between ˜ Jr(V,y,z)a n d ˜ Jn(V,y,z). To this aim, note
that the diﬀerence ˜ Jr(V,y,z)− ˜ Jn(V,y,z) is positive (by assumption). Also, note that the diﬀer-
ence ˜ Jr(V,y,z) − ˜ Jn(V,y,z) is smaller than Fr(γr,V,y,z) − Fn(γn,V,y,z) because ˜ Jr(V,y,z)=
Fr(γr,V,y,z)a n dFn(γn,V,y,z) ≤ ˜ Jn(V,y,z). From these observations and the bounds (5.8),
(5.10) and (5.13), it follows that





|wi,n − wi,r| + βEˆ s
h¯ ¯ ¯(1 − λe˜ pn(ˆ Vi,n))Jn(ˆ Vi,n) − (1 − λe˜ pr(ˆ Vi,r))Jr(ˆ Vi,r)
¯ ¯ ¯
io






1+ ¯ BJαˆ V
¢
+ λe ¯ Bpαˆ V ¯ J
¤ª
ρ,
Since the above inequality holds for all (V,y,z) ∈ X × Y × Z, it implies the result stated in the
lemma. ¥
5.2. Existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium
Now, we are in the position to establish the paper’s main result.
Theorem 5.3. There exists a Block Recursive Equilibrium.
Proof:F i r s t ,ﬁx ε>0 to be an arbitrary real number. Let ρε be the unique positive solution
for ρ of the equation βλeαp (ρ) ¯ J +αjρ = ε. For all Jn,J r ∈ J such that kJn − Jrk <ρ ε,L e m m a
5.2 implies that kTJn − TJrk <ε . Hence, the equilibrium operator T is continuous. Next, let ρy
denote the minimum distance between distinct elements of the set Y ,a n dρz the minimum distance
between distinct elements of the set Z,i . e .ρy =m i n Y |yi − yj| and ρz =m i n Z |zi − zj|.20 Also,
let k.kE denote the standard norm on the Euclidean space X ×Y ×Z.L e t˜ ρε =m i n {υ0ε,ρy,ρ z}.
For all (V1,y 1,z 1), (V2,y 2,z 2) ∈ X × Y × Z such that k(V2,y 2,z 2) − (V1,y 1,z 1)kE < ˜ ρε and all
J ∈ J, Lemma 5.1 implies that TJ satisﬁes the property (J1) of the set J and, consequently,
|(TJ)(V2,y 2,z 2) − (TJ)(V2,y 2,z 2)| <ε . Hence, the family of functions T(J) is equicontinuous.
Finally, Lemma 5.1 implies that the equilibrium operator T maps the set of functions J into
itself.
From these properties, it follows that the equilibrium operator T satisﬁes the conditions of
Schauder’s ﬁxed point theorem (Stokey and Lucas with Prescott, 1989, Theorem 17.4). There-
fore, there exists a ﬁrm’s value function J∗ ∈ J such that TJ∗ = J∗.D e n o t ea sθ∗ the market
tightness function computed with J∗.D e n o t e a s R∗ and m∗ the search value and policy func-
tions computed with θ∗.D e n o t e a s U∗ the unemployment value function computed with R∗.
20If Y contains only one element, we can set ρy = 1. Similarly, if Z contains only one elemet, set ρz =1 .
25Denote as c∗ the contract policy function computed with J∗, θ∗, R∗, m∗,a n dU∗. The functions
{θ∗,R ∗,m ∗,U∗,J∗,c ∗} satisfy the conditions (i)—(v) in the deﬁnition of a recursive equilibrium.
The functions {θ∗,R ∗,m ∗,U∗,J∗,c ∗} depend on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ,o n l y
through the aggregate component of productivity, y, and not through the distribution of workers
across diﬀerent employment states, (u,g). Hence, the functions {θ∗,R ∗,m ∗,U∗,J∗,c ∗} constitute
a Block Recursive Equilibrium. ¥
Directed search is necessary for existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium. To see this





and θ(ψ) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. The term on the LHS of (5.14) is the cost of
creating a vacancy. The expression on the RHS of (5.14) is the maximized beneﬁto fc r e a t i n ga
vacancy. The ﬁrst term on the RHS is the probability that a ﬁrm meets a worker. The second
term denotes the probability that a worker met by a ﬁrm is willing to accept an employment
contract that provides him with the lifetime utility x. The third term is the value to the ﬁrm
of being matched with a worker to whom it has promised the lifetime utility x. With random
search, x is a random draw from the oﬀer distribution, and so a worker’s acceptance probability of
a new match depends on the distribution of workers across employment states. The equilibrium
condition (5.14) holds only if the distribution aﬀects also the equilibrium market tightness or
the ﬁrm’s value function. In either case, the equilibrium fails to be block recursive with random
search. In contrast, directed search eliminates the dependence of the acceptance probability on
the distribution of workers because a worker always accepts a job that he chooses to search for;
that is, I(x∗,ψ)=1w h e r ex∗ = m(V,ψ).21
For the sake of completeness, let us list three other assumptions about the production tech-
nology and the search process that are necessary for existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium:
the linear production function, the vacancy cost independent of the aggregate vacancy rate, and
a matching technology with constant returns to scale. If the production function were either con-
cave or convex, the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states would aﬀect the
output of a match and, in turn, the ﬁrm’s value function, the market tightness function and the
value of unemployment. If the vacancy cost depends the aggregate vacancy rate, the distribution
21When m(V,ψ) is strictly increasing in V , the workers are endogenously separated into diﬀerent submarkets
in the search process. This endogenous separation is a common feature of directed search (e.g., Moen, 1997, and
Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999). It holds not only when heterogeneity is generated after the matching, as in the
current model, but also when there is ex ante heterogeneity (e.g., Shi, 2001).
26of workers across diﬀerent employment states would aﬀect the aggregate vacancy rate, the vacancy
cost and, ultimately, the equilibrium market tightness. Finally, if the matching process between
vacancies and applicants exhibits non-constant returns to scale, the distribution of applicants
across diﬀerent submarkets (and, hence, the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment
states) would aﬀect the market tightness function and, in turn, the ﬁrm’s and worker’s value
functions. We emphasize that these assumptions are standard and that they alone do not lead
to block recursivity of an equilibrium. For example, they are maintained in the models of search
on the job by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and Burdett and
Coles (2003), where the equilibrium fails to be block recursive because search is undirected.
6. Block Recursive Equilibrium with Fixed-Wage Contracts
In the model with ﬁxed-wage contracts, the equilibrium operator T may not be continuous. For
example, the search value function, Rn, and the unemployment value function, Un, computed with
the ﬁrm’s value function Jn may be such that the worker prefers being employed at the wage w
than being unemployed. However, given a ﬁrm’s value function Jr that is arbitrarily close to Jn,
the search value function, Rr, and the unemployment value function, Ur, may be such that the
worker’s preference ordering between employment at the wage w and unemployment is reversed.
When this is the case, the probability with which a worker leaves a job that pays the wage w is
not continuous in J and, hence, the ﬁrm’s value from employing a worker at the wage w, K(w,s)
deﬁn e di n( 2 . 5 ) ,a n dt h eﬁrm’s updated value function, TJ, are not continuous in J.22
Since the equilibrium operator T may not be continuous, we cannot appeal to Schauder’s
theorem in order to prove existence of a ﬁxed point of T, and, in turn, existence of a Block
Recursive Equilibrium. Instead, we adopt the following strategy. We consider a proxy of the
model with ﬁxed-wage contracts in which a worker is not allowed to voluntarily quit his jobs
during the separation stage. Formally, in this proxy model, the equilibrium conditions (2.4) and
(2.5) are replaced by
H(w,ψ)=w + βE ˆ ψ
n
δU( ˆ ψ)+( 1− δ)
h
H(w, ˆ ψ)+λe max{0,R(H(w, ˆ ψ), ˆ ψ)}
io
,( 6 . 1 )
and
K(w,s)=y + z − w + β (1 − δ)Eˆ s
h
(1 − λe˜ p(H(w, ˆ ψ), ˆ ψ))K(H(w, ˆ ψ), ˆ s)
i
.( 6 . 2 )
22This discontinuity does not occur with dynamic contracts, because the future wage path (i.e., the promised
future value) can be adjusted to ensure that job separation rates are close to each other whenever the ﬁrm’s value
functions are close to each other. See the proof of Lemma 5.2.
27We prove that the equilibrium operator associated with the proxy model admits a ﬁxed point
because it satisﬁes all the conditions of Schauder’s theorem (including continuity). Finally, we
use the ﬁxed point to construct a Block Recursive Equilibrium of the proxy model. If, along the
equilibrium path, a worker never has the incentive to quit his job during the separation stage,
the BRE of the proxy model is also a BRE of the original model.
6.1. Employment Value
Given an arbitrary ﬁrm’s value function J ∈ J,l e tR denote the search value function that
solves the equilibrium condition (2.1), and U the unemployment value function that solves the
equilibrium condition (2.2). Given R and U, an employment value function is a solution to the
equilibrium condition (6.1) if and only if it is a ﬁxed point of the mapping TH deﬁned as
(THϕ)(w,ψ)=w + βE ˆ ψ
n
δU(ˆ y)+( 1− δ)
h
ϕ(w, ˆ ψ)+λe max{0,R(ϕ(w, ˆ ψ), ˆ y)}
io
.( 6 . 3 )
In Lemma 6.1, we prove that there exists a unique ﬁxed point of the mapping TH within the set
C(W×Y ) of bounded continuous functions ϕ : W×Y → R (where W is deﬁned below). Therefore,
there exists a unique employment value function, H,t h a ts a t i s ﬁes the equilibrium condition (6.1),
and depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of
productivity, y. Moreover, in Lemma 6.1, we prove that H is strictly decreasing and bi-Lipschitz
continuous in w.
Lemma 6.1. Let W =[ w, ¯ w],w h e r e¯ w is given by [1 − β(1 − δ)]¯ x − βδU and w by x − β[1 −
β(1 − δ)]−1(¯ w + βδ¯ U). (i) There exists a unique function H ∈ C(W × Y ) such that H = THH.
(ii) For all y ∈ Y and all w1,w 2 ∈ W, w1 ≤ w2, H is such that
w2 − w1 ≤ H(w2,y) − H(w1,y) ≤ (w2 − w1)/[1 − β(1 − δ)]. (6.4)
(iii) For all y ∈ Y , H is such that
H(w,y) ≤ x, ¯ x ≤ H(¯ w,y),a l l y ∈ Y . (6.5)
Proof: In Appendix D. ¥
From the properties of the employment value function, H, we can derive some properties of
the wage function, h, which is the solution of the equation H(w,ψ)=V with respect to w.F i r s t ,
since H is strictly increasing in w, h is well-deﬁned. Second, since H is strictly increasing and
28bi-Lipschitz continuous in w, h is strictly increasing and bi-Lipschitz in V . More speciﬁcally, for
all y ∈ Y and all V1, V2 ∈ X,w i t hV1 ≤ V2,w eh a v e
[1 − β(1 − δ)](V2 − V1) ≤ h(V2,y) − h(V1,y) ≤ V2 − V1.( 6 . 6 )
Finally, since H is strictly increasing in w and satisﬁes property (6.5), h(V,y) belongs to the
interval W for all (V,y) ∈ X × Y .
Now, consider two arbitrary functions Jn, Jr ∈ J.L e tRn, Un, Hn and hn denote the functions
computed with Jn. Similarly, let Rr, Ur, Hr and hr denote the functions computed with Jr ∈ J.
Lemma 6.2 proves that as the distance between Jn and Jr converges to zero, the distance between
Hn and Hr and the distance between hn and hr both converge to zero. That is, H and h are
continuous in J.
Lemma 6.2. For any ρ>0 and any Jn, Jr ∈ J,i fkJn − Jrk <ρ ,t h e n
kHn − Hrk <α hρ, khn − hrk <α hρ,
αh ≡ β (αu + λeαR)/(1 − β).
(6.7)
Proof:L e tρ>0 be an arbitrary real number; let Jn and Jr be arbitrary functions in J such
that kJn − Jrk <ρ .L e t ( w,y) be an arbitrary point in W × Y . Then, the distance between
Hn(w,y)a n dHr(w,y) is such that
|Hn(w,y) − Hr(w,y)|
≤ βEˆ y {|Un(y) − Ur(y)| + λe |max{0,R n(Hn(w, ˆ y), ˆ y)} − max{0,R r(Hn(w, ˆ y), ˆ y)}|}
+ βEˆ y {|Hn(w, ˆ y)+λe max{0,R r(Hn(w, ˆ y), ˆ y)} − Hr(w, ˆ y) − λe max{0,R r(Hr(w, ˆ y), ˆ y)}|}
<β (αu + λeαR)ρ + β kHn − Hrk,
where the last inequality makes use of the bounds in (4.12), (4.9), and (4.6). Since the above
result holds for all (w,y) ∈ W × Y , the RHS is an upper bound on kHn − Hrk. Re-arranging
terms yields the bound on kHn − Hrk given by (6.7).
Now, let (V,y) be an arbitrary point in X × Y . The distance between hn(V,y)a n dhr(V,y)i s
such that
|hn(V,y) − hr(V,y)| ≤ |Hn(hn(V,y),y) − Hn(hr(V,y),y)|
= |Hr(hr(V,y),y) − Hn(hr(V,y),y)| <α hρ,
where the ﬁrst inequality uses the fact that Hn(w,y)s a t i s ﬁes condition (6.4), and the equality
uses the fact that Hn(hn(V,y),y)=Hr(hr(V,y),y)=V . Since the above result holds for all
(V,y) ∈ X × Y , the RHS is an upper bound on khn − hrk, as given by (6.7). ¥
296.2. Value Function of the Firm
Let H and ˜ p denote the employment value function and the separation probability computed
with an arbitrary function J ∈ J.G i v e n H and ˜ p,aﬁrm’s value function is a solution to the
equilibrium condition (6.2) if and only if it is a ﬁxed point of the mapping TK deﬁned as
(TKϕ)(w,s)=y + z − w + β (1 − δ)Eˆ s [(1 − λe˜ p(H(w, ˆ y), ˆ y))ϕ(w,ˆ s)]. (6.8)
In Lemma 6.3, we prove that there exists a unique ﬁxed point of the mapping TK within the set
C(W × Y × Z) of bounded continuous functions ϕ : W × Y × Z → R. Therefore, there exists a
unique ﬁrm’s value function, K,t h a ts a t i s ﬁes the equilibrium condition (6.2), and that depends
on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity,
y. Then, we prove that K is bounded between K and ¯ K,w h e r e
−K = ¯ K =m a x
( ¯ ¯y + z − ¯ w
¯ ¯
1 − β(1 − δ)
,
|¯ y +¯ z − w|
1 − β(1 − δ)
)
.
Finally, we prove that K is bi-Lipschitz continuous in w.T h a ti s ,f o ra l lw1 ≤ w2, the diﬀerence
K(w2,y,z) − K(w1,y,z) is bounded between − ¯ BK(w2 − w1)a n d−BK(w2 − w1), where
BK =
1 − β (1 − δ)
¡
1+λe ¯ Bp ¯ K
¢
[1 − β (1 − δ)][1 − β(1 − δ)(1 − λe)]
, ¯ BK =
1 − β(1 − δ)(1 + λe ¯ BpK)
[1 − β(1 − δ)]
2 ,
In the remainder of this section, we will assume that the parameters of the model are such that
0 <B K ≤ ¯ BK < ∞.23
Lemma 6.3. (i) There exists a unique function K ∈ C(W × Y × Z) such that K = TKK.( i i )
For all (y,z) ∈ Y × Z and all w1,w 2 ∈ W,w i t hw1 ≤ w2, K is such that
− ¯ BK(w2 − w1) ≤ K(w2,y,z) − K(w1,y,z) ≤− BK (w2 − w1), (6.9)
(iii) For all (w,y,z) ∈ W × Y × Z, K is such that
K(w,y,z) ∈ [K, ¯ K]. (6.10)
Proof: In Appendix E. ¥
Now, consider two arbitrary functions Jn, Jr ∈ J.L e t Rn, Un, Hn, hn and Kn denote the
functions computed with Jn. Similarly, let Rr, Ur, Hr, hr and Kr denote the functions computed
with Jr ∈ J. Lemma 6.4 proves that as the distance between Jn and Jr converges to zero, the
distance between Kn and Kr goes to zero as well.
23It is immediate to verify that the condition 0 <B K ≤ ¯ BK < ∞ is satisﬁed as long as the probability λe that
an employed worker has the opportunity of searching is not too large.
30Lemma 6.4. For any ρ>0 and any Jn, Jr ∈ J,i fkJn − Jrk <ρ ,t h e n
kKn − Krk <α K(ρ),
αK(ρ) ≡ β(1 − δ)λe ¯ K
¡ ¯ Bpαhρ + αp(ρ)
¢±
[1 − β(1 − δ)].
(6.11)
Proof:L e tρ>0 be an arbitrary real number; let Jn and Jr be arbitrary functions in J such
that kJn − Jrk <ρ .L e t ( w,y,z) be an arbitrary point in W × Y × Z. The distance between
Kn(w,y,z)a n dKr(w,y,z) is such that
|Kn(w,y,z) − Kr(w,y,z)|
≤ β(1 − δ)Eˆ s {|Kn(w,y,z) − Kr(w,y,z)|}
+ β(1 − δ)λe ¯ KEˆ s {|˜ pn(Hn(w, ˆ y), ˆ y) − ˜ pn(Hr(w, ˆ y), ˆ y)| + |˜ pn(Hr(w, ˆ y), ˆ y) − ˜ pr(Hr(w, ˆ y), ˆ y)|}
<β (1 − δ)
£
kKn − Krk + λe ¯ K (Bpαhρ + αp(ρ))
¤
,
where the last inequality makes use of the bounds in (6.7), (6.9) and (4.4). Since this result holds
for all (w,y,z) ∈ W × Y × Z, the RHS is an upper bound on kKn − Krk. Re-arranging terms
yields the bound on kKn − Krk given by (6.11). ¥
6.3. Existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium
In the previous subsections, we have computed the employment value function, H, the wage
function, h,a n dt h eﬁrm’s value function, K, associated with an arbitrary J ∈ J.I n t h i s
subsection, we insert K and h into the right hand side of the equilibrium condition (2.6), and we
compute an update, ˜ J = TJ, for the value function J. More speciﬁcally, ˜ J is given by







πi ∈ [0,1], π1 + π2 =1 , ˜ Vi ∈ X.
(6.12)
The updated function, ˜ J, has four properties. First, ˜ J depends on the aggregate state of
the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y. This property follows
immediately from the fact that both the objective function and the choice set on the right hand
side of (5.1) depend on ψ only through y. Second, the updated value function, ˜ J, is bi-Lipschitz
continuous in V . More speciﬁcally, for all (y,z) ∈ Y × Z and all V1, V2 ∈ X,w i t hV1 ≤ V2,t h e
diﬀerence ˜ J(V2,y,z)− ˜ J(V1,y,z) is bounded between − ¯ BK(V2−V1)a n d−BK(1−β(1−δ))(V2−V1)




for some bounds J and
¯ J that are independent of J and ˜ J.M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, for all (V,y,z) ∈ X × Y × Z, ˜ J(V,y,z)
is greater than K and smaller than ¯ K (see part (ii) in the proof of Lemma 6.5). Finally, ˜ J is
31concave in V (see part (iii) in the proof of Lemma 6.5). Therefore, given the appropriate choices
of BJ, ¯ BJ, J,a n d ¯ J, the updated value function, ˜ J,s a t i s ﬁes conditions (J1), (J2) and (J3) and,
hence, it belongs to the set J. This argument is formalized in the following lemma:
Lemma 6.5. Set J = K,a n d ¯ J = ¯ K.S e t BJ = BK(1 − β(1 − δ)) and ¯ BJ = ¯ BK. Then, the
updated value function, ˜ J, belongs to the set J.
Proof:( i )L e t( V,y,z) be an arbitrary point in X × Y × Z. Then, ˜ J(V,y,z) is such that
˜ J(V,y,z) ≤ max˜ V1∈X K(h(˜ V1,y),y,z) ≤ maxw∈W K(w,y,z) ≤ ¯ K,
˜ J(V,y,z) ≥ min˜ V1∈X K(h(˜ V1,y),y,z) ≤ minw∈W K(w,y,z) ≥ K,
where we used the fact that if ˜ V1 ∈ X then h(˜ V1,y) ∈ W. The above inequalities imply that ˜ J
satisﬁes property (J1) of the set J.
(ii) Let (y,z) be an arbitrary point in Y × Z,a n dV1, V2 two arbitrary points in X,w i t h
V1 ≤ V2.L e t {πi,1, ˜ Vi,1}2
i=1 denote the maximizer of (6.12) for V = V1,a n d{πi,2, ˜ Vi,2}2
i=1 the
maximizer of (6.12) for V = V2.L e t{∆i,1}2
i=1 be a vector such that Σ2
i=1πi,1(˜ Vi,1 + ∆i,1)=V2
and ∆i,1 ∈ [0, ¯ x − Vi,1]. Also, let {∆i,2}2
i=1 be a vector such that Σ2
i=1πi,2(˜ Vi,2 − ∆i,2)=V1 and
∆i,2 ∈ [0,V i,2 − x]. Note that {πi,1, ˜ Vi,1 + ∆i,1}2
i=1 belongs to the choice set of (6.12) for V = V2.
Therefore,










h(˜ Vi,1 + ∆i,1,y) − h(˜ Vi,1,y)
´i
= − ¯ BK(V2 − V1).
Next, note that {πi,2, ˜ Vi,2 − ∆i,2}2
i=1 belongs to the choice set of (6.12) for V = V2. Therefore,










h(˜ Vi,2,y) − h(˜ Vi,2 − ∆i,2,y)
´i
= −BK(1 − β(1 − δ))(V2 − V1).
The above inequalities imply that ˜ J satisﬁes property (J2) of the set J.
(iii) Finally, Appendix F shows that ˜ J is concave with respect to V . Hence, ˜ J satisﬁes property
(J3) of the set J. ¥
Now, consider two arbitrary functions Jn, Jr ∈ J.L e tHn, hn, Kn and ˜ Jn denote the functions
computed with Jn. Similarly, let Hr, hr, Kr and ˜ Jr denote the functions computed with Jr ∈ J.
32Lemma 6.4 proves that as the distance between Jn and Jr converges to zero, the distance between
˜ Jn and ˜ Jr goes to zero as well.
Lemma 6.6. For any ρ>0 and any Jn, Jr ∈ J,i fkJn − Jrk <ρ ,t h e n
|| ˜ Jn − ˜ Jrk <α J(ρ), αJ(ρ) ≡ αK(ρ)+ ¯ BKαhρ. (6.13)
Proof:L e tρ>0 be an arbitrary real number; let Jn and Jr be arbitrary functions in J such
that kJn − Jrk <ρ .D e n o t ea sHn, hn and Kn the functions computed with Jn,a n dHr hr and
Kr the functions computed with Jr.L e t ( V,y,z) be an arbitrary point in X × Y × Z.T h e
distance between ˜ Jn(V,y,z)a n d ˜ Jr(V,y,z) is such that
¯ ¯




h¯ ¯ ¯Kn(hn(˜ V1)) − Kn(hr(˜ V1))
¯ ¯ ¯ +




£ ¯ BK khn − hrk + kKn − Krk
¤
≤ αK(ρ)+ ¯ BKαhρ,
where the last inequality makes use of the bounds in (6.7), (6.9) and (6.11). Since this result
holds for all (V,y,z) ∈ X × Y × Z, the RHS is an upper bound on || ˜ Jn − ˜ Jr||. ¥
Lemma 6.5 implies that the equilibrium operator T maps the set J into itself. Moreover,
since the functions in the set J a r eb i - L i p s c h i t za n dt h es e t sY and Z are ﬁnite, Lemma 6.5
implies that the family of functions T(J) is equicontinuous. In addition, Lemma 6.6 implies that
the operator T is continuous. Since these properties of the operator T are suﬃcient to apply
Schauder’s ﬁxed point theorem, there exists a function J∗ ∈ J such that TJ∗ = J∗.C l e a r l y ,t h e
ﬁrm’s value function J∗, together with the associated tightness function θ∗, search value function
R∗, search policy function m∗, and unemployment value function U∗, constitute a Block Recursive
Equilibrium. This completes the proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 6.7. There exists a Block Recursive Equilibrium for the proxy of the model with
ﬁxed-wage contracts.
For any Block Recursive Equilibrium of the proxy model, we can compute the worker’s value
of unemployment, U∗(y), and the worker’s value of employment at the beginning of the search
stage, H∗(w,y)+λe max{0,R ∗(H∗(w,y),y)}. A BRE of the proxy model is a BRE of the original
model if
U∗(y) ≤ H∗(w,y)+λe max{0,R ∗(H∗(w,y),y)} (6.14)
for all equilibrium wages w and for all realizations of the aggregate component of productivity
y. This condition implicitly restricts the parameter values of the model. We do not explicitly
33characterize this restriction here. However, notice that, since unemployed workers search for jobs
that oﬀer lifetime utility H∗(w,y) greater than U∗(y) and since employed workers search for even
better jobs, (6.14) is likely to be satisﬁed as long as aggregate productivity shocks are suﬃciently
small. This is the case in the calibrated example below.
7. A Calibrated Example
In Sections 5 and 6, we have established existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium for our
stochastic model of directed search on the job. In this section, we want to illustrate additional
properties of a BRE. To this aim, we calibrate the parameters of the model using the data on
the US labor market. Given the calibrated parameters, we construct the equilibrium operator T
a n dw ea p p l yi tt oa na r b i t r a r yv a l u ef u n c t i o n ,J ∈ J,u n t i lw er e a c haﬁxed point, J∗. Then,
we construct a BRE by computing the agents’ value functions, policy functions and the market
tightness function associated with J∗.F o rt h es a k eo fb r e v i t y ,w er e p o r to u rﬁndings only for the
version of the model with ﬁxed-wage contracts.
The workers’ preferences are described by the discount factor β, and the value of leisure b.
The search technology is described by the probability that an unemployed worker is able to look
for a job, λu, by the probability that an employed worker is able look for a job, λe,a n db yt h e
job-ﬁnding probability function, p(θ). We assume that p(θ)i so ft h ef o r mθ(1 + θγ)−1/γ.T h e
production technology is described by the vacancy creation cost k, the exogenous job-destruction
probability δ, and the stochastic processes for the idiosyncratic and the aggregate components
of productivity. We assume that the idiosyncratic component of productivity, z,i sa l w a y se q u a l
to zero, and that the aggregate component of productivity, y, obeys a two-state Markov process,
with y ∈ {0.95,1.05}. The unconditional mean of y is normalized to 1.
We set the model period to be one quarter. We set β equal to 0.987, so that the annual interest
rate in the model is 5 percent. We set k, δ,a n dλe equal to 0.001, 0.045, and 0.3 respectively,
so that the average transition rates between employment, unemployment, and across employers
are the same in the model as in the US data.24 We normalize λu to 1. We tentatively set γ
equal to 0.5, which implies an the elasticity of substitution between vacancies and applicants of
2/3. Finally, we set b equal to 0.7, so that the consumption value of leisure is 70 percent of the
consumption value of work (a ﬁgure that is empirically supported by Hall and Milgrom, 2008).
Given these parameter values, we compute a BRE of the proxy model. In Figure 1, we plot the
market tightness as a function of the value oﬀered by the ﬁrms to the workers, x, and conditional
24T h ed a t au s e df o rt h ec a l i b r a t i o na r ed e s c r ibed in Section 5 of Menzio and Shi (2008).
34on the realization of the aggregate component of productivity, y. In accordance with Lemma 4.1,
we ﬁnd that the market tightness is decreasing with respect to x.M o r e o v e r , w e ﬁnd that the
market tightness is higher when the aggregate component of productivity is higher. Intuitively,
when y is higher, ﬁrms create more vacancies per applicant because the value of ﬁlling a vacancy
is higher.
In Figure 2, we plot the worker’s optimal search strategy as a function of the value, V ,o f
his current employment position, and conditional on the realization of the aggregate component
of productivity, y. In accordance with Lemma 4.3, we ﬁnd that the worker seeks jobs that oﬀer
more generous terms of trade (and are harder to get) when the value of his current employment
position is higher. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the worker seeks jobs that oﬀer more generous terms
of trade and are easier to get when the aggregate component of productivity is higher (see Figure
3).
In Figure 4, we plot the worker’s employment value as a function of the wage w, conditional on
the realization of the aggregate component of productivity, y. Similarly, in Figure 5, we plot the
ﬁrm’s value of employing a worker as a function of the wage w, conditional on y.W eﬁnd that the
worker’s value of being employed is increasing in w,w h i l et h eﬁrm’s value of having an employee
is decreasing in w.M o r e o v e r ,w eﬁnd that the worker’s and ﬁrm’s values are both increasing with
respect to the the aggregate component of productivity. Intuitively, when y is higher, the worker’s
value is higher because the value of unemployment and the return to searching are higher. The
ﬁrm’s value is higher because its periodical proﬁt (conditional on the survival of the employment
relationship) is higher. From these properties of H∗ and K∗, it follows immediately that the
ﬁrm’s value of ﬁlling a vacancy in submarket x is decreasing in x, and increasing in y (see Figure
6).
The equilibrium functions θ∗, m∗,a n dH∗ illustrate that the BRE preserves some attractive
qualitative features of the models by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002) and Burdett and Coles (2003). For example, the BRE generates residual wage inequality
because, if ex-ante homogeneous workers have diﬀerent luck with their job searches, they will be
employed at diﬀerent wages. The BRE features a positive return to tenure because workers who
are employed at lower wages search in tighter submarkets and, hence, have a higher probability
of leaving their job. For the very same reason, the BRE also features a negative relationship
between tenure and job hazard.
Finally, using the equilibrium functions θ∗, m∗, H∗, K∗, J∗ and U∗,w es i m u l a t et h el i f eo fa n
unemployed worker. We ﬁnd that, whenever the worker is employed, he prefers keeping his job
35than moving into unemployment. That is, we ﬁnd that condition (6.14) is satisﬁed everywhere
along the equilibrium path. Therefore, the BRE of the proxy model is also a BRE of the original
model with ﬁxed-wage contracts.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we prove existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium for a general model of directed
search on the job, which allows for aggregate shocks, idiosyncratic shocks, risk aversion, and
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the contractual environment. The BRE of our model preserves a number
of attractive qualitative properties of the models of random search on the job by Burdett and
Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and Burdett and Coles (2003). That is,
the BRE features ﬂows of workers between employment, unemployment, and across diﬀerent
employers; it features residual wage inequality, and a positive return to tenure and experience.
However, the BRE of our model diﬀers from these models in that it takes into account directed
search and that it is tractable for studying dynamics. In the equilibrium of the random search
models, the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states is an inﬁnite-dimensional
object which non-trivially aﬀects the agents’ value and policy functions. In the BRE of our model,
the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states does not aﬀect the agents’ value
and policy functions. For this reason, while solving the equilibrium of the random search model
in a stochastic environment is a diﬃcult task both computationally and analytically, solving the
BRE of our model is as easy as solving a representative agent model. These properties of the
BRE make our model both a useful and a practical tool for studying labor market dynamics.
Our method for characterizing the BRE will also be useful for studying dynamics in related
markets. For example, Shi (2001) has used a directed search model to characterize the equilib-
rium and eﬃcient patterns of the assignment between ex ante heterogeneous jobs and workers.
However, he does not allow agents to continue to search after they are matched. By allowing
for on-the-job search in that model, one can use the method in the current paper to study the
dynamics of the assignment. Another example is the model by Gonzalez and Shi (2008), who
characterize a labor market equilibrium in which each unemployed worker learns about his type
during search. As workers’ matching histories diverge during the search process, there is a non-
degenerate distribution of workers’ beliefs, and this distribution is an aggregate state variable of
the economy. The analysis of the equilibrium in Gonzalez and Shi (2008) is tractable precisely
because search is directed and the equilibrium is block recursive. However, they focus on the
steady state. Using the method in the current paper, one can study aggregate dynamics of the
learning equilibrium.
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A. Properties of the Set of Functions J
Lemma A.1. J is a non-empty, bounded, closed and convex subset of the space of bounded,
continuous functions on X × Y × Z,w i t ht h es u pn o r m .
Proof: (i) Clearly, the set J is non-empty and bounded.
(ii) Next, we need to prove that the set J is closed. To this aim, let {Jn}∞
n=1 be an arbitrary
sequence with Jn ∈ J for every n,a n dw i t hJn → J (in the sup norm). Note that, since Jn → J,
for every ε>0, there exists N(ε) ≥ 1 such that n ≥ N(ε)= ⇒ kJn − Jk <ε .
For arbitrary (y,z) ∈ Y ×Z and arbitrary V1, V2 ∈ X,w i t hV1 ≤ V2, suppose that the diﬀerence
J(V2,y,z) − J(V1,y,z) is strictly smaller than − ¯ BJ(V2 − V1). Let ε>0 be one third of the
diﬀerence between − ¯ BJ(V2−V1)a n d[ J(V2,y,z)−J(V1,y,z)]. Let n be a natural number greater
than N (ε). Since ||Jn − J|| <ε , the diﬀerence Jn(V2,y,z) − Jn(V1,y,z) is such that
Jn(V2,y,z) − Jn(V1,y,z) <J(V2,y,z) − J(V1,y,z)+2 ε
= 1
3 [J(V2,y,z) − J(V1,y,z)] − 2
3 ¯ BJ(V2 − V1)
< − ¯ BJ(V2 − V1).
The last inequality contradicts Jn ∈ J. Therefore, J(V2,y,z) − J(V1,y,z) is greater than
− ¯ BJ(V2 −V1)f o ra l l( y,z) ∈ Y ×Z and all V1, V2 ∈ X,w i t h V1 ≤ V2. Using a similar argument,
we can prove that J(V2,y,z)−J(V1,y,z) is smaller than −BJ(V2 −V1) for all (y,z) ∈ Y ×Z and
all V1, V2 ∈ X,w i t h V1 ≤ V2.T h a ti s ,J satisﬁes property (J1) of the set J.
For all (V,y,z) ∈ X × Y × Z, it is immediate to verify that J(V,y,z) ∈ [J, ¯ J]. Hence, J satisﬁes
property (J2) of the set J. For arbitrary (y,z) ∈ Y ×Z, arbitrary V1, V2 ∈ X, and arbitrary α ∈
[0,1], suppose that J(Vα,y,z) is strictly smaller than αJ(V1,y,z)+(1−α)J(V2,y,z), where Vα =
αV1+(1−α)V2.L e tε>0 be one third of the diﬀerence between [αJ(V1,y,z)+( 1− α)J(V2,y,z)]
and J(Vα,y,z). n be a natural number greater than N (ε). Since ||Jn − J|| <ε ,w eh a v e
Jn(Vα,y,z) <J(Vα,y,z)+ε
= αJ(V1,y,z)+( 1− α)J(V2,y,z) − 2ε
<α J n(V1,y,z)+( 1− α)Jn(V2,y,z) − ε
<α J n(V1,y,z)+( 1− α)Jn(V2,y,z).
The last inequality contradicts Jn ∈ J. Therefore, J(Vα,y,z) is greater than αJ(V1,y,z)+( 1−
α)J(V2,y,z)f o ra l l( y,z) ∈ Y × Z,a l lV1,V 2 ∈ X and all α ∈ [0,1]. That is, J satisﬁes property
(J3) of the set J. This establishes that J ∈ J and, hence, that the set J is closed.
39(iii) Finally, we need to prove that the set J is convex. To this aim, consider arbitrary J1,
J2 ∈ J a n da na r b i t r a r yα ∈ [0,1]. Denote Jα(V,y,z)=αJ1(V,y,z)+( 1− α)J2(V,y,z). For all
(y,z) ∈ Y × Z and all V1, V2 ∈ X,w i t hV1 ≤ V2, the diﬀerence Jα(V2,y,z) − Jα(V1,y,z)i ss u c h
that
Jα(V2,y,z) − Jα(V1,y,z)
= α[J1(V2,y,z) − J1(V1,y,z)] + (1 − α)[J2(V2,y,z) − J2(V1,y,z)]
∈
£
−BJ(V2 − V1),− ¯ BJ(V2 − V1)
¤
.
Hence, Jα satisﬁes property (J1) of the set J. For all (V,y,z) ∈ X×Y ×Z, it is immediate to verify
that Jα(V,y,z) ∈ [J, ¯ J]. Hence, Jα satisﬁes property (J2) of the set J. For all (y,z) ∈ Y × Z,
V1, V2 ∈ X,a n dζ ∈ [0,1], let Vζ = ζV1 +( 1− ζ)V2. Then, Jα(Vζ,y,z) is such that
Jα(Vζ,y,z)
= αJ1(Vζ,y,z)+( 1− α)J2(Vζ,y,z)
≥ α[ζJ1(V1,y,z)+( 1− ζ)J1(V2,y,z)] + (1 − α)[ζJ2(V1,y,z)+( 1− ζ)J2(V2,y,z)]
= ζJα(V1,y,z)+( 1− ζ)Jα(V2,y,z).
Hence, Jα satisﬁes property (J3) of the set J. This establishes that Jα ∈ J and, hence, that the
set J is convex. ¥
B. Proof of Lemma 4.1
(i) For the sake of brevity, let us suppress the dependence of various functions on y and z.L e ty
be an arbitrary point in Y ,a n dl e tx1, x2 be two points in X with x1 ≤ x2. First, consider the
case in which x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ˜ x. In this case, the diﬀerence θ(x2) − θ(x1)i se q u a lt o
θ(x2) − θ(x1)=q−1(k/J(x2)) − q−1(k/J(x1)) =
Z k/J(x2)
k/J(x1)
q−10(t)dt,( B . 1 )
where the ﬁrst equality makes use of (4.1), and the second equality makes use of the fact that
J(x1) ≥ J(x2) ≥ k>0. For all x ∈ [x, ˜ x], the derivative of the inverse function q−1(.) evaluated
at k/J(x)i se q u a lt o1 /q0(θ(x)) ∈ [1/q0(¯ θ),1/q0(0)], where 1/q0(¯ θ) ≤ 1/q0(0) < 0. Therefore, the



































40For all x ∈ [x,˜ x], J(x)i ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gi nx and it is bounded between ¯ J and k. Therefore,
















¯ J2 [J(x1) − J(x2)] ≥
BJk
¯ J2 (x2 − x1).
(B.3)
Taken together, (B.2) and (B.3) imply that the diﬀerence θ(x2) − θ(x1) is such that
¯ BJ
q0(¯ θ)k
(x2 − x1) ≤ θ(x2) − θ(x1) ≤
BJk
q0(0) ¯ J2(x2 − x1). (B.4)
Next, consider the case in which x1 ≤ ˜ x ≤ x2.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ed i ﬀerence θ(x2) − θ(x1)i ss u c h
that
θ(x2) − θ(x1)=θ(˜ x) − θ(x1) ≤
BJk
q0(0) ¯ J2(˜ x − x1) ≤ 0,
θ(x2) − θ(x1)=θ(˜ x) − θ(x1) ≥
¯ BJ
q0(¯ θ)k




where the ﬁrst equality in both lines makes use of the fact that θ(x2)=θ(˜ x), and the ﬁrst
inequality in both lines makes use of the bounds in (B.4). Finally, consider the case in which
˜ x ≤ x1 ≤ x2. In this case, (4.1) implies that θ(x1)=θ(x2)=0 .
(ii) The function p(θ) is strictly increasing in θ. The function θ(x) is strictly decreasing in x for
all x ∈ [x, ˜ x]. Therefore, the composite function p(θ(x)) is strictly decreasing in x for x ∈ [x, ˜ x].
In order to prove that the composite function p(θ(x)) is strictly concave in x for x ∈ [x, ˜ x],
consider arbitrary x1, x2 ∈ [x, ˜ x], with x1 6= x2, and an arbitrary number α ∈ (0,1). Let
xα = αx1 +( 1− α)x2. Since the function J(x)i sc o n c a v ei nx and the function k/x is strictly













Since p(q−1(.)) is strictly decreasing and weakly concave, the previous inequality implies that
p(q−1 (k/J(xα)) >p (q−1(αk/J(x1)+( 1− α)k/J(x2)))
≥ αp(q−1(k/J(x1))) + (1 − α)p(q−1(k/J(x2))).
(B.5)
Since q−1(k/J(x)) is equal to θ(x)f o ra l lx ∈ [x, ˜ x], (B.5) can be rewritten as
p(θ(xα)) >α p (θ(x1)) + (1 − α)p(θ(x2)). (B.6)
This establishes that the composite function p(θ(x)) is strictly concave in x for all x ∈ [x, ˜ x].
¥
41C .P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . 6
(i) For all ϕ1,ϕ 2 ∈ C(Y ), with ϕ1 ≤ ϕ2, the diﬀerence TUϕ2 − TUϕ1 is such that
(TUϕ2)(y) − (TUϕ1)(y)
= βE ˆ ψ {ϕ2(ˆ y) − ϕ1(ˆ y)+λu [max{0,R(ϕ2(ˆ y), ˆ y)} − max{0,R(ϕ1(ˆ y), ˆ y)}]} ≥ 0,
(C.1)
where the last inequality uses the fact that the function V +λu max{0,R(V )} is increasing in V .
For all ϕ ∈ C(Y )a n da l la ≥ 0, TU(ϕ + a) is such that
[TU(ϕ + a)](y)= ( TUϕ)(y)+βE ˆ ψ {a + λu [max{R(ϕ + a),0} − max{R(ϕ),0}]}
≤ (TUϕ)(y)+βa,
(C.2)
where, for the sake of brevity, we have suppressed the dependence of various variables from the
aggregate state ˆ y. Conditions (C.1) and (C.2) are suﬃcient to prove that the operator TU is a
contraction mapping (Stokey and Lucas with Prescott, 1989, Theorem 3.3). Hence, there exists
one and only one U such that TUU = U.
(ii) Let ϕ ∈ C(Y ) be a function that is bounded between U and ¯ U. Then, TUϕ is such that
(TUϕ)(y) ≥ υ(b)+βU = U,
(TUϕ)(y) ≤ υ(b)+β¯ x = ¯ U,
(C.3)
where the ﬁr s tl i n em a k e su s eo ft h ef a c t st h a tϕ ≥ U and R(ϕ(ˆ y), ˆ y) ≥ 0; and the second line
makes use of the fact that ϕ+λu max{0,R(ϕ(ˆ y), ˆ y)} ≤ ¯ x. From the inequalities in (C.3), it follows
that the operator TU maps the set of functions that are bounded between U and ¯ U into itself.
Since the operator TU is a contraction, it follows that its ﬁxed point, U, is bounded between U
and ¯ U. ¥
D .P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . 1
(i) For all ϕ1,ϕ 2 ∈ C(W × Y ), with ϕ1 ≤ ϕ2, the diﬀerence THϕ2 − THϕ1 is such that
(THϕ2)(w,y) − (THϕ1)(w,y)
= β(1 − δ)Eˆ y
∙
ϕ2(w, ˆ y)+λe max{0,R(ϕ2(w, ˆ y), ˆ y)}




where the last inequality uses the fact that the function V + λe max{0,R(V,ˆ y)} is increasing in
V . For all ϕ ∈ C(W × Y )a n da l la ≥ 0, TH(ϕ + a)i ss u c ht h a t
[TH(ϕ + a)](w,y)= w + βEˆ y {δU +( 1− δ)[ϕ(w, ˆ y)+λe max{0,R(ϕ(w, ˆ y), ˆ y)}]}
+β(1 − δ)Eˆ y {a + λe max{0,R(ϕ(w, ˆ y), ˆ y)} − λe max{0,R(ϕ(w, ˆ y)+a, ˆ y)}}
≤ (THϕ)(w,y)+β(1 − δ)a,
(D.2)
42where the last inequality uses the fact that R(V,ˆ y)−R(V +a, ˆ y) ≤ 0. Conditions (D.1) and (D.2)
are suﬃcient to prove that the operator TH is a contraction mapping. Hence, there exists one
and only one H such that THH = H.
(ii) Let ϕ ∈ C(W × Y ) be a function that satisﬁes condition (6.4). Let y be an arbitrary point
in Y ,a n dw1, w2 two arbitrary points in W with w1 ≤ w2. For all ˆ y ∈ Y , the diﬀerence
f(w2, ˆ y) − f (w1, ˆ y) is bounded between 0 and [1 − β(1 − δ)]−1(w2 − w1). Therefore,
(THϕ)(w2,y) − (THϕ)(w1,y)
= w2 − w1 + β(1 − δ)Eˆ y
∙
ϕ(w2, ˆ y)+λe max{0,R(ϕ(w2, ˆ y), ˆ y)}
−ϕ(w1, ˆ y) − λe max{0,R(ϕ(w1, ˆ y), ˆ y)}
¸
∈ [1, 1/[1 − β(1 − δ)]](w2 − w1).
(D.3)
The bounds in (D.3) imply that the operator TH maps functions that satisfy (6.4) into functions
that satisfy (6.4). Since TH is a contraction, its unique ﬁxed point H satisﬁes (6.4).
(iii) Let ¯ V denote
¡
¯ w + βδ¯ U
¢
/[1 − β (1 − δ)]. Let ϕ ∈ C(W × Y ) be an arbitrary function such
that (THf)(¯ w,y) ∈ [¯ x, ¯ V ] for all y ∈ Y . The function THϕ is such that (THϕ)(¯ w,y) ∈ [¯ x, ¯ V ]f o r
all y ∈ Y ,b e c a u s e
(THϕ)(¯ w,y) ≥ ¯ w + βδU + β (1 − δ)¯ x =¯ x,
(THϕ)(¯ w,y) ≤ ¯ w + βδ¯ U + β (1 − δ) ¯ V = ¯ V .
Therefore, the ﬁxed point, H, is such that H (¯ w,y) ∈ [¯ x, ¯ V ] for all y ∈ Y .M o r e o v e r ,H(w,y) ≤ x
for all y ∈ Y ,b e c a u s e
H(w,y) ≤ w + β
£
δ ¯ U +( 1− δ)Eˆ y
£¯ V + λe max{0,R(¯ V,ˆ y)}
¤¤
≤ x. ¥
E. Proof of Lemma 6.3
(i) It is immediate to verify that, for all ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ C(W ×Y ×Z), if ϕ1 ≤ ϕ2 then TKϕ1 ≤ TKϕ2.
It is also immediate to verify that, for all ϕ ∈ C(W × Y × Z)a n da l la>0, TK(ϕ + a)i ss m a l l e r
than TKϕ+βa. These two conditions are suﬃcient to prove that the operator TK is a contraction
mapping. Hence, there exists one and only one K ∈ C(W × Y × Z) such that TKK = K.
(ii)-(iii) Let ϕ ∈ C(W ×Y ×Z) satisfy conditions (6.9)—(6.10). Let (y,z) be an arbitrary point in
Y × Z,a n dw1, w2 arbitrary points in W with w1 ≤ w2. The diﬀerence between (TKϕ)(w2,y,z)
43and (TKϕ)(w1,y,z) is such that
(TKϕ)(w2,y,z) − (TKϕ)(w1,y,z)
= w1 − w2 + β(1 − δ)Eˆ s {[1 − λe˜ p(H(w2, ˆ y), ˆ y)][ϕ(w2, ˆ y,ˆ z) − ϕ(w1, ˆ y,ˆ z)]}
+ β(1 − δ)Eˆ s {λe [˜ p(H(w1, ˆ y), ˆ y) − ˜ p(H(w2, ˆ y), ˆ y)]ϕ(w1, ˆ y,ˆ z)}
≤−
n
1+β(1 − δ)(1 − λe)BK − [1 − β (1 − δ)]
−1 β(1 − δ)λe ¯ Bp ¯ K
o
(w2 − w1)
= −BK(w2 − w1),
(E.1)
where the ﬁrst inequality makes use of the bounds in (6.6), (6.9), (4.8) and (6.10). Moreover, the




1+β(1 − δ) ¯ BK − [1 − β (1 − δ)]
−1 β(1 − δ)λe ¯ BpK
o
(w2 − w1)
= − ¯ BK(w2 − w1),
(E.2)
where the ﬁrst inequality makes use of the bounds (6.6), (6.9), (4.8) and (6.10).
Let w be an arbitrary point in W. Then, TKϕ is such that
(TKϕ)(w,y,z) ≤ ¯ y +¯ z − w + β(1 − δ) ¯ K ≤ ¯ K,
(TKϕ)(w,y,z) ≥ y + z − ¯ w + β(1 − δ)(1− λe)K ≥ K.
(E.3)
Inequalities (E.1)—(E.3) imply that the operator TK maps functions that satisfy conditions (6.9)—
(6.10) into functions that satisfy (6.9)—(6.10). Since the operator TK is a contraction, its unique
ﬁxed point, K,s a t i s ﬁes conditions (6.9)—(6.10). ¥
F. Two-Point Lotteries and Concavity of the Value Function
Let K (x) be a continuous function, where x ∈ [x, ¯ x]. Consider the following problem with a
two-point lottery:
J (V )= m a x (π,x1,x2) [πK (x1)+( 1− π)K (x2)]
s.t. πx1 +( 1− π)x2 = V , x1 ≤ V ≤ x2, π ∈ [0,1].
(F.1)
The above problem encompasses the maximization problems in (5.1) and (6.12) as special cases.
(In these problems, the lottery is contingent on the realizations of aggregate and match-speciﬁc
shocks, (y,z), which is suppressed here.)
We want to prove that J (V ) is concave. To this end, consider arbitrary V ∈ (x, ¯ x). Let (x∗
1,x ∗
2)
be the solution for (x1,x 2)i n( F . 1 ) . I fK (V )i ss t r i c t l yc o n v e xa tV ,i tm u s tb et r u et h a t
44x∗
1 <V <x ∗
2.T h u s , i f x∗
1 = x∗
2,t h e nJ (V )=K (V )m u s tb ec o n c a v ea tV . In the remainder
of the proof, it suﬃces to examine the case where x∗
1 <x ∗
2. For any arbitrary x1,x 2 ∈ (x, ¯ x),






Using the constraint in (F.1) to express π =( x2 − V )/(x2 − x1), we can rewrite J(V )i nt h e
following equivalent forms:
J(V )= m a x
(x1,x2)
[K (x2) − (x2 − V )L(x1,x 2)] = max
(x1,x2)
[K(x1)+( V − x1)L(x1,x 2)].
The following results hold:
(A) For all x ∈ [x, ¯ x], K(x) must lie on or below the extension of x∗
1x∗







2 >V,t h e nx∗
1 =a r gm i n x≤x∗
2 L(x,x∗
2)a n dx∗
2 =a r gm a x x≥x∗
1 L(x∗
1,x).
Proofs of (A) and (B). For (A), consider ﬁrst the case x ∈ [x∗
1,x ∗
2]. (We will return to the case
x/ ∈ [x∗
1,x ∗
2] after proving (B).) Result (A) holds trivially when x = x∗
1 or x = x∗
2. To show that
(A) also holds for x ∈ (x∗
1,x ∗
2), suppose to the contrary that (A) is violated by some x0 ∈ (x∗
1,x ∗
2).




1). If x0 = V ,t h e n( x0,x 0)i so p t i m a l .I fx0 <V,t h e n
(x0,x ∗
2) is feasible and dominates (x∗
1,x ∗
2). If x0 >V ,t h e n( x∗
1,x 0) is feasible and dominates
(x∗
1,x ∗
2). The result in each of these cases contradicts the optimality of (x∗
1,x ∗
2).
For (B), we only prove the ﬁrst part, i.e., the part for x∗
1, since the proof of the result for x∗
2 is




x ≤ V .F o rx ∈ (V,x∗
2), K(x) is on or below the line connecting K(x∗
1)a n dK(x∗
2) (see the proven
part of (A) above), and so L(x∗
1,x ∗
2) ≤ L(x,x∗
2). Thus, (B) holds.
Now we prove that (A) also holds for x/ ∈ [x∗
1,x ∗
2] .I f( A )d i dn o th o l df o rs o m ex0 <x ∗




2), which would contradict (B). If (A) did not hold for some x0 >x ∗
2,t h e n
L(x∗
1,x 0) >L (x∗
1,x ∗
2), which would again contradict (B). ¥
Lemma F.1. J (V ) is a concave function.
Proof.L e t V1 and V2 be two arbitrary values in [x, ¯ x], and let Vα = αV1 +( 1− α)V2,w h e r e
α ∈ (0,1). Denote (x∗
1i,x ∗
2i) as the solution to the maximization problem when V = Vi,w h e r e
i ∈ {1,2,α}. We show that J(Vα) ≥ αJ(V1)+( 1− α)J(V2).
45Applying (A) to any x ∈ [x∗
11,x ∗
21], we know that K(x) cannot lie above the extension of x∗
1αx∗
2α.
Thus, all points on x∗
11x∗
21 must lie on or below the extension of x∗
1αx∗
2α. This implies that
J(V1) ≤ J(Vα)−Lα(Vα−V1), where Lα = L(x∗
1α,x ∗
2α). Similarly, applying (A) to any x ∈ [x∗
12,x ∗
22]
yields: J(V2) ≤ J(Vα)+Lα(V2 − Vα). Thus,
αJ(V1)+( 1− α)J(V2) ≤ J(Vα)+Lα [α(V1 − Vα)+( 1− α)(V2 − Vα)] = J(Vα).
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Figure 3: Job Finding Probability
p(V,yl) p(V,yh)
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